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INNOVATING FEDERALISM IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
Myrisha S. Lewis*
ABSTRACT

This Article challenges the view that the US. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has exclusiveJurisdiction over life sciences innovations. Many current and forthcoming
life sciences innovations are "innovative therapies" such as gene editing, gene therapy,
and regenerative stem cell treatments, which are actually "hybrids" of state and federal
Jurisdiction. Thus, both state and federal Jurisdiction coexist: federal Jurisdiction exists
to the extent that these medical innovations use drugs or biologics, but stateJurisdiction
exists to the extent that these innovations are procedures regulated by states as the
practice of medicine.
This Article argues that the regulation of numerous current and forthcoming
innovative therapies requires the recognition of a state-federal partnership not only
because both federal and state Jurisdiction already coexist but also because a
cooperative form of shared governance would improve the transparency and quality of
regulation. This Article provides a structural framework for that shared governance that
draws on existing federal-state cooperative programs and applies the advantages of
cooperative federalism, with an emphasis on often neglected actors in the realm of
regulating innovative therapies: states. Incorporating this Article's cooperative
structural framework would (I) curtail the federal usurpation of state Jurisdiction,
(2) minimize the significance of the FDA's resource shortage by complementing federal
regulation, and (3) reduce the likelihood that the FDA would continue to unlawfully
incorporate political and social motivations into its decision-making process. Applying
this Article's cooperative framework would also serve to recognize the continued
existence of both state and federal Jurisdiction over innovative therapies.
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INTRODUCTION

While a professional athlete, Kobe Bryant had several injuries that threatened to
derail his career. 1 After several surgeries on his right knee, Kobe Bryant often underwent
a treatment, Regenokine, that used his own blood to aid his recovery and to maintain the
health of his knee.2 While this treatment arguably prolonged his career, one problematic
aspect of this treatment was that, at the time Kobe Bryant began using it, he had to travel
to Germany to obtain it.3 According to the U.S Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
even though the procedure used Bryant's own blood, the fact that additives were
combined with Bryant's own blood before it was injected back into him meant that the
product was subject to the FDA's approval process, which would lengthen the amount
of time that would pass before the treatment would become available in the United
States. 4 While this regulatory delay is not as problematic for individuals like Kobe Bryant
who could simply travel to Germany where the procedure was pioneered, Americans
without Kobe Bryant's resources or sophisticated medical team might be tempted to
travel to a less reputable domestic provider or to an umegulated clinic in another country
without Germany's or the United States' regulatory standards, which could lead to
significant harm.5
The United States' federal regulatory structure continues to be challenged by
innovations in medicine.6 This Article focuses on what it refers to as "innovative
1. See Joshua Sexton.A Gruesome Look at Kobe Bryant's Injury History, BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1015940-a-gruesorne-look-at-kobe-bryants-injury-history [https://perma.cc/
2XSH-V6XQ].
2. See id. See also infra note 9 for an explanation of the Regenokine treatment, including the process
involved and how it is regulated in the United States.
3. Will Carroll, What Is This Knee Treatment Kobe Bryant Goes All the Way to Germany For?,
BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 4, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/l 798763-what-is-this-knee-treatrnent-kobe
bryant-goes-all-the-way-to-germany-for [https://perma.cc/DF3R-DA7D].
4.

Id.

5. See Liz Kowalczyk, He Went Abroad for Stem Cell Treatment. Now He's a Cautionary Tale, Bos.
GLOBE (June 22, 2016), http://www.bostonglobe.com/rnetro/2016/06/22/went-abroad-f or-stern-cell-treatrnent
now-cautionary-tale/wH8d9uLejaDvSwWRt9 l w5L/story.htrnl [https://perma.cc/B2NN-3 3RD] (detailing the
case of Jim Gass who traveled to Argentina, China, and Mexico for stern cell treatments and is now "more
disabled than he was prior to stern cell therapy").
6. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-432, FDA NEEDS MORE STRATEGIC
PLANNING To GUIDE ITS SCIENTIFIC INITIATIVES (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677116.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y8XH-5FDJ] ("FDA has faced challenges regulating medical products [("drugs, devices, and
biologic products . . . which include[s] vaccines, blood products, and proteins," id. at 1 n.l )], owing in part to
rapid changes in science and technology."); Balbara J. Evans, The Limits of FDA 's Authority To Regulate
Clinical Research Involving High-Throughput DNA Sequencing, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 259, 259 & n.5 (2015)
("These [proposed FDA regulatory efforts to regulate laboratory developed tests] sparked heated debates about
whether FDA has authority to regulate genomic testing and the potential impact such regulation may have on
genomic discovery and innovation."); Diane Hof fmann et al., Improving Regulation ofMicrobiota Transplants,
3 58 Ser. 1390, 1390 (2017) ("The advent of these applications for [microbiota transplants] poses challenges for
regulatory bodies. The transplanted material is not a 'typical' drug, and thus may not be appropriate for the drug
regulatory pathway. The material consists of a community of highly dynamic, metabolically active organisms.
. . Each batch of 'product' is different, making characterization of the transplanted material problematic."); Insoo
Hyun, Allowing Innovative Stem Cell-Based Therapies Outside of Clinical Trials: Ethical and Policy
Challenges, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 277, 279-80 (2010) (discussing the ethical and regulatory challenges that
accompany stern-cell based innovative therapies); Gary E. Marchant & Yvonne A. Stevens, Resilience: A New
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therapies." In this Article, "innovative therapies" are life sciences innovations that
combine federally regulated products and state-regulated procedures, as states regulate
the practice of medicine and the federal government regulates medical products.7
Examples of innovative therapies include regenerative stem cell treatments and
treatments that target defective genes, including gene therapies and gene editing.8
Overregulation motivates Americans to travel abroad in search of innovative
therapies. For example, during their professional careers, Kobe Bryant, Alex Rodriguez,
Peyton Manning, and other professional athletes traveled to Europe for medical
treatments that were not (and are still not) approved by the FDA, including certain
regenerative stem cell treatments.9 While these treatments may be successful (or at least
not harmful) for professional athletes, results may be less positive for members of the
general public who, lacking the resources of professional athletes, also travel in pursuit
of these treatments but to countries with far less regulation, or lately, due to
Tool in the Risk Governance Toolbox for Emerging Technologies. 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233. 237 (2017)
("Emerging technologies such as nanotechnology. synthetic biology. artificial intelligence/robotics. CRISPR
gene editing. and applied neuroscience present significant governance challenges."); Jordan Paradise.
Cultivating Innovation in Precision Medicine Through Regulatory Flexibility at the FDA. 11 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 672. 675 (2017) [hereinafter Paradise. Cultivating Innovation] ("Precision medicine poses challenges
to traditional FDA regulatory paradigms."); Rachel E. Sachs & Carolyn A. Edelstein. Ensuring the Safe and
Effective FDA Regulation of Fecal Microbiota Transplantation. 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 396. 415 n.116 (2015)
("The FDA has undoubtedly faced numerous new challenges throughout its history. and it has had to consider
how it might adapt old statutes to new problems.").
7. See infra Section I for more on the practice-products divide in the regulation of medicine. See also
infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text for more on innovative therapies. including common characteristics
such as their failure to fit clearly within FDA-regulated categories and their designation as "combination
products" by the FDA.
8. See infra Part LC for a discussion of such therapies.
9. Regenokine is a technique in which a patient's blood is combined with other substances. including
anti-inflammatory agents. in a laboratory before that blood is injected back into a patient. See Carroll. supra note
3. Regenokine is referred to as a "blood spinning therapy." See id. Due to the mixture of a patient's blood with
other substances. however. the FDA's regulatory position is that such a treatment is a mixture that constitutes
"more than minimal manipulation" under the FDA's Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products regulatory
scheme, thus requiring the submission of an investigational new drug application. FDA, REGULATORY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS: MINIMAL
MANIPULATION AND HOMOLOGOUS USE: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF 1, 4 (2017), http://www.fda.gov/media/124138/download [https://perrna.cc/7KBL-VRZL]. Even though
Regenokine is reportedly available now in the United States, athletes continue to travel abroad to obtain it. See,
e.g., Marc Carig, Yankees Slugger Alex Rodriguez Reportedly Goes to Germany for Knee Treatiuent, NJ.COM
(Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.nj.com/yankees/index.ssf/2011/12/yankees_slugger_alex _rodriguez_8.htrnl
[https://perrna.cc/XD85-BASD]. For more on the availability of Regenokine in the United States, see Lloyd
Sederer, An Arthritis Treatiuent Worthy of the Pope and Kobe, ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/10/an-artbritis-treatment-worthy-of-the-pope-and
kobe/261606/ [https://perma.cc/MEL4-K2GV]; see also Antonio Regalado, The NFL Has a Problem with Stem
Cell Treatiuents, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/s/533171/the-nfl-has-a
problem-with-stem-cell-treatrnents/ [https://perma.cc/7DQE-A5KJ]; Jenny Vrentas, Stem Cell Treatiuent: Out
from the Shadows, onto the Cutting Edge, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 30, 2014),
http://www.si.com/2014/07/30/stem-cell-treatment-nfl-sports-medicine [https://perrna.cc/5TBZ-JYS8]. For
more on the minimal manipulation standard in FDA regulations, which establishes when the use of a patient's
own cells or tissues are subject to FDA approval, see, for example, Myrisha S. Lewis, Halted Innovation: The
Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction over Medicine and the Human Body, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 1073, 1098
[hereinafter Lewis, Halted Innovation].
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underregulation, to domestic states with less restrictive regulatory regimes. 10 How does
one improve the U.S. scheme of regulating life sciences so that athletes and other
individuals do not have to travel internationally or seek the services of those governed
by less restrictive regulatory regimes that may not adequately regulate therapies for their
safety and effectiveness? 11
Recently, the now-former FDA commissioner observed, regarding regenerative
stem cell therapies, that "[t]he FDA must advance an efficient and least burdensome
framework as a way to help new products remain compliant with the law through a
regulatory structure that does not become a barrier to beneficial new innovation." 12 This
Article responds to that call and simultaneously extends it to other innovative
therapies: this Article argues that efficiently (and transparently) regulating forthcoming
innovative therapies requires a larger role for individual states.
This Article also builds on previous scholarship that explains how the FDA does
not have exclusive jurisdiction over innovative life sciences techniques and also how the
FDA's regime is inadequate to regulate these techniques. 13 There are several problems
with the current way the FDA exercises jurisdiction. First, the current method of
regulation fails to recognize the longstanding "practice-products distinction" in the
state-federal regulatory system, where states regulate the practice of medicine and the
federal government regulates the products used in the practice of medicine. 14 Not only is
the line between medical practice and medical products blurring over time but also
scholars question whether the FDA should be regulating innovative technologies in the
current manner because those "products" do not fit within the FDA's regulatory scheme,
in spite of the agency's assertions of jurisdiction. 15
Within the realm of life sciences innovations, this Article focuses on innovative
therapies that it labels as "hybrids" of federal and state jurisdiction because they involve
federally regulated products and the state-regulated practice of medicine. As a
10. See, e.g., Kowalczyk, supra note 5 (discussing "stern cell tourism" due at least in part to publicity
surrounding professional athletes' pursuit of stern cell treatments abroad). See also infra Part I.C.3 for a
discussion of stern cell treatments and tbeir availability in certain states.
11. See Kirstin R.W. Matthews & Maude L. Cuchiara, U.S. National Football League Athletes Seeking
Unproven Stem Cell Treatinents, 23 STEM CELLS & DEV. 60, 60 (2014) ("The majority of patients journey from
industrialized countries to developing ones where federal regulations may be more lenient or nonexistent."); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2) (2018); Balbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 425-26 (2010) [hereinafter
Evans, Seven Pillars] (discussing "safety and efficacy" in the context of FDA regulation).
12. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Adrnin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb,
M.D. on the FDA's New Policy Steps and Enforcement Efforts To Ensure Proper Oversight of Stern Cell
Therapies and Regenerative Medicine (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncernents/ucrn573443.htrn [https://perma.cc/PJF9-Y79K]. Scott Gottlieb was the FDA
Commissioner until April 5, 2019. See Scott Gottlieb, MD., FDA, http://www.fda.gov/node/373545
[https://perrna.cc/P6BS-F6UP] (last updated Apr. 19, 2019).
13. See supra notes 6-7, infra note 14 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Section I; see also, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Distinguishing Product and Practice Regulation
in Personalized Medicine, 81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 288, 288 (2007) ("Targeted drug
therapies and the screening tests that support tbern raise tbomy issues of how to draw tbe line between regulation
of medical products and regulation of medical practice. Careful line-drawing has always been important, lest
product regulations limit physicians' discretion to use products as they deem best for tbe individual patient.").
15. See infra Section I for an analysis of tbe FDA's regulatory scheme.
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jurisdictional matter, forthcoming innovative therapies such as gene editing (including
CRISPR-Cas9, which has received a significant amount of media attention), gene
therapy, and autologous stem cell therapies involve state jurisdiction over the practice of
medicine and federal jurisdiction over the approval of specific categories of products that
the FDA regulates. 16 Nevertheless, the federal goveflllllent continues to regulate these
innovations without adequate statutory authority. 17 Recently, for example, a former chief
counsel of the FDA expressed doubt as to whether the FDA's current statutes enabled
the FDA to regulate gene therapy, one of the innovative therapies this Article addresses. 18
Second, precedent shows that although representatives of the FDA acknowledge
jurisdictional limitations in statements to the public and Congress, a close analysis of the
agency's actual decisionmaking reveals that the agency does include political and social
considerations in its decision-making process, which are outside of its statutory mandate
and contrary to administrative law's goals of transparency and accountability. 19

16. See infra Part LC for an analysis of these forthcoming innovative therapies.
17. See infra Part LC; supra notes 6-7; see also Myrisha S. Lewis. How Subterranean Regulation Hinders
Innovation in Assisted Reproductive Technology. 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1239. 1243 (2018) [hereinafter Lewis.
How Subterranean] (arguing that forms of assisted reproductive technology involve genetic modifications that
fall outside of the FDA's jurisdiction). For support of the FDA's method of asserting jurisdiction. see Peter
Barton Hutt. Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
101, 102 (1995). Peter Barton Hutt is a former chief counsel of the FDA. See id. at 103. For criticism of the
FDA's method of asserting jurisdiction, see Gail H. Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Regulating (for the Benefit of)
Future Persons: A Different Perspective on the FDA 's Jurisdiction To Regulate Human Reproductive Cloning,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 1201, 1202 & n.4 (citing Richard A. Merrill & Bryan J. Rose, FDA Regulation of Human
Cloning: Usurpation or Statesmanship?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 100, 124 (2001) (Richard A. Merrill was a
former chief counsel of the FDA)); Lewis, Halted Innovation, supra note 9, at 1073. Nonetheless, generally,
most scholars write from the position that the FDA has jurisdiction over these techniques. Similarly, the position
of FDA employees, even in congressional testimony, is that the FDA has jurisdiction over such innovations. See,
e.g., Lewis, How Subterranean, supra, at 1273-74.
18. See FDA Conference Videos: Plenary Session 2: A Discussion with Former FDA Chief Counsels,
AM. U. WASH. C. L. (Oct. 19, 2018), http://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/initiatives-programs/
health/events/fdaconf l8/videos/ [https://perma.cc/ZG7A-F3J4] [hereinafter Plenary Session 2] (containing
remarks of Daniel Troy, former chief counsel of the FDA).
19. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130-31, 1141 (2010) [hereinafter Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight] ("[I]n a
2009 decision invalidating a Food and Dmg Administration . . . decision to make the emergency contraceptive
Plan B available only to women eighteen and older, a federal judge found that contact between the White House
and the agency was a factor weighing against upholding the agency action." (citing Tummino v. Torti, 603 F.
Supp. 2d 519, 547 (E.D.N.Y. 2009))); id. at 1141 n.66 ("Whether or not it was permissible . . . these discussions
were not the norm for the FDA with respect to this type of decision." (omission in original) (quoting Tummino,
603 F. Supp. 2d at 547)); see also Daniel A. Farner & Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1168 (2014) ("Agencies rarely acknowledge these political considerations explicitly,
though few commentators and scholars dispute their importance."); id. (also discussing the impact of political
considerations on the FDA's Plan B decision); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism
Accountability: "Agency-Forcing"Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2128, 2131-43 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey,
Federalism Accountability] (discussing "federal agencies' dismal track record on accountability"); id. at 2190
(observing, while discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), which
addressed the interface between federal regulations and state law, "[l]urkingjust beneath the surface of the Wyeth
majority opinion is deep suspicion that the FDA changed its position on preemption for political as opposed to
scientific or risk management reasons"). See infra Part I.A for a discussion of the FDA's use of informal tools
to regulate innovative therapies. See also Lewis, How Subterranean, supra note 17, at 1273-74 (discussing the
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Sometimes, overregulation results when regulators introduce concerns such as politics
into regulatory decisionmaking, as evidenced by the delay in the conversion of
emergency contraception from a prescription drug product to an over-the-counter drug. 20
Further, when the FDA makes decisions for reasons other than safety or effectiveness,
the administrative state is not structured so that the public and the judicial system can
easily ascertain those underlying motivations. 2 1 By strengthening the role of states in the
regulation of innovative therapies, the significance of improperly motivated regulatory
decisions may be minimized.
This Article contributes to the health law, administrative law, federalism, and
innovation literatures by focusing on the significance of the sometimes neglected states
in the regulatory system. 22 Increasing the role of the states in the regulatory process adds
another "check" on administrative agencies other than the judiciary. 23 This Article argues
that the regulation of numerous current and forthcoming innovative therapies requires
the recognition of a state-federal partnership not only because both federal and state
jurisdiction already coexist but also because a cooperative form of shared governance
would improve the transparency and quality of regulation.
Drawing on the literatures of federalism, administrative law, and health law, this
Article offers a structural solution for a specific subset of life sciences
innovations: innovative therapies. Because state and federal jurisdiction coexist,
improvements to the scheme for regulating innovative therapies should include both state

role of social and ethical issues in agency decisionrnaking on topics such as human reproductive cloning and
forms of assisted reproductive technology involving genetic modifications).
20. See generally Lisa Heinzerling. The FDA 's PlanB Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 GEO.
L.J. 927, 928-76 (2014) ("With every new stratagem, the FDA dug itself deeper into an administrative law hole:
inventing policies on the fly, grasping at tangents, shrouding the tmth, and cowering before illegitimate political
demands.").
21. See, e.g., Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight, supra note 19, at 1128-29.
22. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Preemption and Commandeering Without Congress, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 2029, 2031 (2018) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Preemption]; Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty
To Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1852 (2015) [hereinafter Metzger, The Constitutional Duty] ("Cooperative
federalism denotes instances in which state and local governments undertake primary responsibility for
implementing federal programs or enforcing federal law under the supervision and oversight of federal
agencies." (citing Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 459, 472-75 (2012) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard])); id. at 1853 ("Major
legislative and administrative initiatives of the last few years have significantly increased the scope of such
federal-state cooperation. Not only is the federal government asking states to play new roles in federal programs,
but it is also giving states broader discretion and control over the shape of their participation. The Affordable
Care Act is a prime example."); Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100
VA. L. REV. 953, 954-55, 981-84 (2014); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665, 671 (2001). See infra Sections II and III for more on
federalism in health law.
23. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy
Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 859-62, 883 (1998) (noting that
overlapping jurisdiction between states and the federal government "allows Congress to play state and federal
officials off of each other to avoid dishonesty or corruption by either"); see also Richard A. Merrill, The
Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1782 (1996) [hereinafter
Merrill, The Architecture] ("In sum, in the new drug approval process-as in most administrative licensing
regimes-FDA exercises effectively unchallengeable authority to dictate the number and kinds of studies
required to support approval and nearly unreviewable discretion to interpret the results.").
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and federal governments. Thus, this Article argues for the recognition of separate state
and federal spheres for the regulation of innovative therapies. Doing so would facilitate
and strengthen an overlooked aspect of innovative therapies, which is that states also
play an important regulatory role. Specifically, this Article's cooperative framework
draws on the concept of "cooperative federalism."
Cooperative federalism, as will be further detailed in Section III, is a form of
governance in which, instead of situating all authority for regulation of a particular area
in the federal government, states are able to experiment subject to the existence of federal
baselines, federal agency oversight, and federal judicial review.24 Section III also
explains the criteria that would trigger the use of this Article's cooperative framework,
which are the existence of state jurisdiction, an innovative therapy that would implicate
state jurisdiction, a "combination product" under the FDA's regulatory scheme, and the
FDA's assertion of jurisdiction via guidance documents.25 An additional criterion that
might exist for some therapies but not others includes the likelihood that the therapy's
use would be accompanied by political or social controversy. Although the traditional
tools of cooperative federalism do not completely solve the problem of adequately
regulating innovative therapies, those traditional tools provide some structures that could
serve as a starting point to resolving the issue this Article identifies. 26 This Article builds
upon those traditions in its proposed structural solution, "A Cooperative Framework for
Regulating Innovative Therapies," outlined in Section III, which would tailor the
regulatory system to regulating innovative therapies. The structural solution emphasizes
increasing the role of states in the regulation of innovative therapies by using a number
of aspects of cooperative federalism programs, including a state-federal committee and
increasing the role of the states in monitoring innovative therapies.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section I provides legal background on the current
regulation of innovative therapies, with an emphasis on the jurisdictional boundaries of
federal and state regulation and the complexities of regulating innovative therapies that
are hybrids of state and federal jurisdiction. Section II assesses the weaknesses of the
current regulatory system and examines alternative options available for improving the
regulation of life sciences innovation. Section III provides background on the concept of
cooperative federalism and examines existing state and federal cooperative schemes in
medicine and related areas, including Medicaid, communicable disease prevention, food
regulation, and nuclear medicine. Ultimately, Section III proposes a novel, cooperative
24. See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 128-29 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("Congress initially considered a single national solution, namely, a Federal Communications
Commission wireless tower siting policy that would pre-empt state and local authority. But Congress ultimately
rejected the national approach and substituted a system based on cooperative federalism. State and local
authorities would remain free to make siting decisions. They would do so, however, subject to minimum federal
standards-both substantive and procedural-as well as federal judicial review." (citations omitted)); see also
Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 U.C. IRVINEL. REV. 177, 179 (2018).
25. See infra Parts I.A and II.A for a discussion of federal regulation and the weaknesses of the current
regime.
26. See infra Part III.A; see also Metzger, The Constitutional Duty, supra note 22, at 1852-54 (noting the
usefulness of federal funding in cooperative federalism and programs providing increased state-federal
cooperation such as the Affordable Care Act's "state-mn health benefit exchanges, expanded federally funded
state Medicaid programs, and state enforcement of its insurance requirements"). For a criticism of cooperative
federalism, see Michael S. Greve. Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 559 (2000).
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regulatory solution that could significantly improve the regulation of innovations in
medicine, especially as innovative therapies continue to evolve past standard legal
classifications.
I.

REGULATION OF INNOVATIVE THERAPIES:

THE PRACTICE-PRODUCTS DISTINCTION

Traditionally, the line between state and federal jurisdiction relies on the distinction
between medical practice, which is regulated by individual states, and medical products,
which are regulated by the federal govermnent. However, that line has been "blurring"
over time.27 As medical innovations move toward more individualized therapies, the line
between what is the practice of medicine and what is the use of a federally regulated
product becomes less clear.28 Nevertheless, as this Article argues, even if a "bright line"
cannot be drawn between medical practice and federally regulated products, both state
and federal jurisdiction apply to the innovative therapies this Article discusses.29
This Section provides an overview of the current system for regulating innovation
in medicine. Part I.A provides an overview of the federal regulation of products used in
the practice of medicine. Part I.B provides an overview of state jurisdiction over the
practice of medicine. Part I.C illustrates how the practice-products distinction operates
in the context of innovative therapies, such as gene therapy, gene editing, and
regenerative medicine therapies, which are "hybrids" of state and federal jurisdiction and
how, due to jurisdictional constraints and regulatory goals, increased state-federal
cooperation is required in the regulation of innovative therapies.
A. Federal Regulation of the Products Used in the Practice of Medicine

The FDA regulates a number of products for safety and effectiveness, including
drugs, biologics, food, medical devices, cosmetics, and tobacco, through a regime that
emphasizes information disclosure, with a focus on providing the information on the

27. See, e.g., Sarah Duranske, Reforming RegenerativeMedicine Regulation, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 631,
639-40 (2018); Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 11, at 500---03, 509-10, 517-18; Patricia J. Zettler,
Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 892 (2017) [hereinafter Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism]; see
also Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal Primacy in the Licensure of Pharmaceutical Products, 2016 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1, 15 [hereinafter Noah, State Affronts] ("Congress['s] repeated[] . . . assurances that the FDA's
authority to license therapeutic products would not interfere with the practice of medicine.").
28. See Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, supra note 27, at 888-92 ("The blurriness of the
practice-products distinction revealed by recent state dmg regulation may have significance . . . . And this line
drawing may be particularly difficult when the FDA is faced with questions about whether, and how, to regulate
new medical technologies that may not fit comfortably within the agency's existing framework.").
29. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Adrnin., supra note 12.
At the same time, it's incumbent upon the FDA to make sure that this existing framework is properly
defined, with bright lines separating new treatments that are medical products subject to the FDA's
regulation from those therapies that are individualized by surgeons in such a way that they are not
subject to FDA regulation. The field of regenerative medicine, because of the very nature of the
science and the rapidly evolving clinical developments, not infrequently lends itself to often close
calls between what constitutes an individualized treatment being performed by a doctor within the
scope of his medical practice on the one hand, and what constitutes a medical product that is currently
subject to the authorities Congress has already charged the FDA with exercising.
Id.
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risks and benefits of approved products.30 In 1938, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) created a new system of drug regulation requiring federal approval by the FDA
before marketing begins.31 The FDA bases its approval on a number of statutory factors
including "safety and effectiveness." 32
The FDA also operates with the goal of encouraging medical innovation and
hastening the speed through which innovations are approved, which requires an efficient
and effective regulatory process.33 This goal has been furthered through various
congressional enactments. First, recently, the 2 1st Century Cures Act instituted a number
of reforms to hasten the FDA approval of certain products, namely those designated as
"regenerative advanced therapies." 34 Second, before the 2 1st Century Cures Act, other
legislation also aimed to accelerate the drug approval process, including the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act, which created a process for the accelerated approval of generic
drugs.35 Third, just as Congress created regimes to expedite the approval of
30. See What Does FDA Regulate?. FDA. http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/
Basics/ucrnl94879.htrn [https://perrna.cc/2BCH-FRBD] (last updated Mar. 28. 2018); see also Merrill. The
Architecture. supra note 23. at 1801-36 (discussing federal medical-device regulation); Patricia J. Zettler. The
Indirect Consequences of Expanded OjfLabel Promotion. 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1053. 1059 (2017) [hereinafter
Zettler. Indirect Consequences]. For scholarly assessments of the federal drug approval process. see. for
example. Noah. State Affronts. supra note 27. at 9; Lars Noah. Triage in the Nation'sMedicine Cabinet: The
Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 748 (2003); Christina Sandefur,
Safeguarding the Right To Try, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 514-15 (2017); Kara W. Swanson, Food and Drug Law
as Intellectual Property Law: Historical Reflections, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 331, 332-37.
31. Milestones in U S. Food and Drug Law History, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdas-evolving
regulatory-powers/rnilestones-us-food-and-drug-law-history [https://perrna.cc/4ZSX-6LEN] (last updated Jan.
31, 2018). For more on the FDA's drug-approval process, see, for example, Zettler, Indirect Consequences,
supra note 30, at 1061, 1086; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2018); Stacey B. Lee, PLIVA v. Mensing: Generic
Consumers' Unfortunate Hand, 12 YALE J. HEALTI-! PoL'Y, L., & ETI-IICS 209, 214 (2012); Merrill, The
Architecture, supra note 23, at 1764-68, 1776-92 (discussing the 1962 FDCA amendments).
32. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(C).
33. See, e.g., Arny Kapczynski, Dangerous Times: The FDA 's Role in Information Production, Past and
Future, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2357, 2379 (2018).
34. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, 1033 (2016),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW- l 14publ255/pdf/PLAW- l 14publ255.pdf [https://perrna.cc/F5R4-7Q4U]
(stating the purpose of the Act is "[t]o accelerate the discovery, development, and delivery of 21st century cures,
and for other purposes"). For more on existing processes and legislation providing accelerated product approval,
see, for example, Jordan Paradise, 21st Century Citizen Pharma: The FDA & Patient-Focused Product
Development, 44 AM. J.L. & MED. 309, 323-26 (2018) [hereinafter Paradise, 21st Century Citizen Pharma];
supra note 12 and accompanying text for the statement of former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb on the
relationship between the FDA's regulatory framework and innovation; see also Kapczynski, supra note 33, at
2379.
35. See Examining the Senate and House Versions of the 'Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals
Act': Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7-10 (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief
Counsel, U.S. Food & Drug Adrnin.), http://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-l 08shrg9l832/pdf/CHRG
l 08shrg91832.pdf [https://perrna.cc/LY7Q-BKS9]; FDA, A HISTORY OF TI-IE FDA AND DRUG REGULATION IN
TI-IE UNITED STATES (2006), http://www.fda.gov/rnedia/73549/download [https://perrna.ccNL63-V9WM]. The
abbreviated drug approval process for generic drugs is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355G). For information on new
brand-name drug applications, see 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50-314.90 (2019); Merrill, The Architecture, supra note
23, at 1792-1800 (discussing congressional amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1984
and 1992). For more on the role of patents within the FDA's regulatory regime, see, for example, Frequently
Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developrnent-approval-process-
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pharmaceuticals, especially generic pharmaceuticals, Congress also "created a
significant new abbreviated approval process for biological products."3 6 Fourth, while
the practical effectiveness of the recently enacted federal "right to try" legislation, which
was based on state legislation allowing patients to access pharmaceuticals at the clinical
trial state before those pharmaceuticals are FDA approved, remains to be seen, the
legislation had the goal of accelerating patient access to pharmaceuticals.37 Additionally,
statements by former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, while in office, also
emphasized the importance of efficient and effective regulatory processes.38
The FDA's system of regulation is structured to regulate products that fall within
clearly defined categories, namely food, drugs, biologics, medical devices, and
tobacco. 39 A device is "an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,

drugs/frequently-asked-questions-patents-and-exclusivity [https://perma.cc/6BA W-WDSW] (last updated May
2. 2018).
36. See Paradise. Cultivating Innovation. supra note 6. at 691 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2018)); see also
21 U.S.C. § 3 56(c) (containing the provision regarding expedited approval of drugs for serious or life-threatening
diseases or conditions); Jonathan J. Darrow et al.. The FDA Breakthrough-Drug Designation Four Years of
Experience. 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1444. 1444 (2018) (discussing the implementation of the expedited approval
process for breakthrough therapies); Susan Bartlett Foote & Robert J. Berlin. Can Regulation Be As Innovative
As Science and Technology? The FDA 's Regulation of Combination Products, 6 MINN. J.L. Ser. & TECH. 619,
630 (2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262); Implementation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of
2009, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/ucm215089.htrn [https://
perma.cc/HGB4-HLWL] (last updated Feb. 12, 2016).
37. While the FDA has an "expanded access" program in which those who are not participants in clinical
trials can gain access to the pharmaceuticals being tested in those trials, "advocates seeking less restrictive rules
have [historically] turned to state legislatures," often through "right to try" laws. Rebecca Dresser, The "Right
to Try" Investigational Drugs: Science and Stories in the Access Debate, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1631, 1640 (2015);
see also 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (outlining expanded access to unapproved therapies and diagnostics); Trickett
Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. l l 5176, § 2, 132 Stat. 1372, 1372 (2017) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a); Abigail All. for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697-99 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en bane); Sam Adriance,
Fighting for the "Right To Try" Unapproved Drugs: Law as Persuasion, 124 YALE L.J.F. 148, 148-52 (2014)
(describing the origins of the "right to try" movement); Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Promoting Patient
Interests in Implementing the Federal Right to Try Act, 320 JAMA 869, 869 (2018),
http://jarnanetwork.com/journals/jarna/article-abstract/2697358 [https://perma.cc/5FBY-7HFA] (discussing the
FDA's Expanded Access Program); Kapczynski, supra note 33, at 2374-76; id. at 2361 (noting that state right
to-try laws "had little practical effect, because their main provisions were preempted by federal FDA law"); id.
at 2367--68, 2368 n.56 (explaining that the FDA "allows individuals who are seriously ill to choose to take
experimental drugs via its compassionate-use program, and it approves nearly all such requests"); Morten
Wendelbo & Timothy Callaghan, What Is "Right to Try" and Will It Help Terminally Ill Patients?, CBS NEWS
(May 30, 2018, 2:35 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/right-to-try-bill-trump-signing-will-it-help
terminally-ill-patients-today-2018-05-30/ [https://perma.cc/2WLW-ZUA2] (observing that (1) right to try
legislation does not require pharmaceutical companies to provide experimental medications to patients; and (2)
despite the legislation, there are many disadvantages to providing access to unapproved experimental
medications to patients, including cost to patients, possible legal liability for pharmaceutical companies, and the
potential that the eventual approval of the drugs by the FDA might be delayed due to the data collected (and the
manner in which it was collected)).
38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for the statement of former FDA Commissioner Gottlieb;
see also supra note 29 for an analysis of the FDA's existing regulatory framework.
39. See supra note 27 for information about the FDA's authority to regulate medicine and its relationship
with the practice of medicine. See also 21 U.S.C. § 321; Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008); Is
The Product A Medical Device?, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/classify-your-medical-
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implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article . . . intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease, in man or other animals."40 Under the FDCA, a "drug" is defined
as follows:
(A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official
Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National
Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in
man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.4 1
Under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), which also provides the FDA with
jurisdiction, a "biologic" or "biological product" is
a vims, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component
or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized
polypeptide), or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of
arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable
to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human
beings.42
Nonetheless, although the FDA's system of regulation is category driven, many
innovative therapies either do not fit within the categories of regulated products or fall
in between categories. The FDA addresses this situation under the rubric of "combination
products"; "innovative therapies," as the term is used in this Article, often implicate
combination products.43 Combination products can include various combinations, and a
combination product could be any combination of drug, device, or biologic product.44
For example, a combination product could be both a drug and a device, such as a prefilled
syringe, both a drug and a biologic, such as a "[m]onoclonal antibody combined with a
therapeutic drug," or even a combination of all three categories of products.45 For
device/product-medical-device [https://perma.cc/3GRS-T6ZX] (last updated Mar. 22. 2018) ("Medical devices
range from simple tongue depressors and bedpans to complex programmable pacemakers with micro-chip
technology and laser surgical devices. In addition. medical devices include in vitro diagnostic products. such as
general purpose lab equipment. reagents. and test kits . . . ."). While medical devices are not implicated in the
innovative therapies at issue in this Article. they are relevant to this Article's arguments on preemption.
40. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
41. Id. § 321(g)(l).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(l) (2018); see also Paradise. Cultivating Innovation. supra note 6. at 692
(explaining that "a biological product is distinct from a drug because of its source (as biological rather than
chemically synthesized)").
43. 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(l)(A) ("The Secretary shall. in accordance with this subsection. assign a primary
agency center to regulate products that constitute a combination of a drug. device. or biological product."); see
also Foote & Berlin. supra note 36. at 621 (identifying tissue engineering. nanomedicine. and gene therapy as
"growth area[s] for combination product research").
44. 21 U.S.C. § 353(g).
45. See, e.g., id.; Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala, 963 F. Supp. 20, 28 (D.D.C. 1997)
("The . . . products all likely meet both the definition of a drug and the definition of a device under the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and the FDA therefore has discretion in determining how to treat them." (citing
21 U.S.C. § 353(g))); see also FDA Regulation of Combination Products; Public Hearing, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,801,
65,801-04 (Oct. 28, 2002), http://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2002-10-28/pdf/02-27267.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GH8G-QPRA]; Matthew Avery & Dan Liu, Bringing Smart Pills toMarket: FDA Regulation
of Ingestible Drug/Device Combination Products, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 329, 330 n.14 (2011); Frequently Asked
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combination products, the FDA Office of Combination Products determines a product's
"primary mode of action." 46 Next, the Office of Combination Products assigns "primary
jurisdiction" for a combination product to the FDA center that corresponds with the
product's "primary mode of action."47
In spite of the existence of "combination products," many recent innovations in
medicine, including those that are classified as combination products, still do not wholly
fall within the categories of products traditionally FDA regulated.48 The FDA also uses
guidance documents and other agency-issued documents to explain agency regulatory
policy and to assert jurisdiction over various therapies that also tend to be therapies over
which the FDA's jurisdiction is uncertain.49 The literature on emerging technologies has
emphasized the use of flexibility instead of traditional regulation to address emerging
technologies; however, guidance documents are not the only method of regulating
innovative therapies.50 The FDA characterizes guidance documents, which are
nonbinding agency pronouncements, as "describ[ing the] FDA's interpretation of [its]
policy on a regulatory issue" although guidance documents go much further than simply
interpreting the FDA's policy, with many of these documents proclaiming the FDA's
jurisdiction over innovative therapies.5 1
The many guidance documents and assertions of jurisdiction, often explaining how
the agency's statutory categories will apply to new technologies, also indicate how the
Questions About Combination Products. FDA. http://www.fda.gov/combination-products/about-combination
products/frequently-asked-questions-about-combination-products [https://perma.cc/L7TU-RQ24] (last updated
Sept. 4. 2019).
46. 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(l)(C); Frequently Asked Questions About Combination Products. supra note 45.
47. Frequently Asked Questions About Combination Products. supra note 45; see also Office of
Combination
Products.
FDA.
http://www.fda.gov/about-fda/office-special-medical-programs/officecombination-products [https://perma.cc/S2Z7-RM6D] (last updated Sept. 19. 2018).
48. See, e.g., Foote & Berlin, supra note 36, at 631, 637-41 ("Combination products continue to present
challenges to the regulatory stmcture of the FDA. How to regulate innovative combinations raises issues that
are similar to those that arose around the emergence of innovative dmgs, devices, and biologics in the last
century.").
49. See Lewis, Halted Innovation, supra note 9, at 1096-1108; infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text;
see also Colleen R. Kelly et al., Guidance on Preparing an Investigational New Drug Application for Fecal
Microbiota Transplantation Studies, 12 CLINICAL GASTROENTEROLOGY & HEPATOLOGY 283, 283 (2014)
(noting that while the FDA will exercise enforcement discretion for the use of fecal microbiota transplantation
to treat clostridium difficile, the positions of the FDA and the NIH remain that an investigational new dmg
application is still required for research; as such, without the requisite documentation, federal funding through
the NIH would not be available); Information About SelfAdministration of Gene Therapy, FDA, http://www.
fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/cellulargenetherapyproducts/ucm5863 43.htm [https://perrna.cc/W4 SN-E4N8]
(last updated Nov. 21, 2017) ("FDA considers any use of CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing in humans to be gene
therapy. . . . Clinical studies of gene therapy in humans require the submission of an investigational new dmg
application (IND) prior to their initiation in the United States, and marketing of a gene therapy product requires
submission and approval of a biologics license application (BLA). . . . [Additionally, t]he sale of [ 'do it yourself
gene therapy 'kits'] is against the law. FDA is concerned about the safety risks involved."). See generally Lewis,
How Subterranean, supra note 17, at 1241 ("The FDA uses subterranean regulation to regulate medical
techniques that are accompanied by ethical controversy including cloning, advanced assisted reproductive
technologies, and unconventional methods of enhancing fertility.").
50. See Marchant & Stevens, supra note 6, at 252-53; Paradise, Cultivating Innovation, supra note 6, at
676.
51. See Guidances, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-basics-industry/guidances [https://
perrna.cc/9U5H-6Z9X] (last updated May 24, 2018).
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FDA has developed an ad hoc system of regulating innovations in medicine over the
years.52 While the issuance of guidance documents can benefit regulated entities (and
their attorneys) who would like a preview of how the agency plans to apply a statute or
exercise its enforcement discretion, there are also disadvantages. For example, there is a
"consensus" in administrative law that "guidance documents should be tolerated only
grudgingly" as there is a "concern that agencies routinely use guidance documents to
establish binding rules while evading the procedural obstacles that might otherwise deter
them from acting."53 Although guidance documents generally do not go through the
notice and comment process typically used to generate binding rules, they may achieve
practically binding effect in spite of prominent disclaimers of their nonbinding nature.54
These FDA-centric agency pronouncements focus on informing the public that the
FDA has jurisdiction over certain innovations, without acknowledging the limitations of
the FDA's jurisdiction and the existence of state authority.55 As a practical matter, these
agency proclamations are especially problematic because they often coincide with the
agency imposing regulatory burdens that effectively ban or significantly curtail access to
52. Lewis, How Subterranean, supra note 17, at 1239, 1255, 1257-62. See generally Merrill & Rose,
supra note 17, at 88 ("The FDA's claims of jurisdiction over human cloning have nonetheless created a de facto,

if possibly hollow, regulatory regime. Rather than a thoughtful strategy for meeting a novel re gulatory challenge,
the Agency's repeated assertions apparently represent a response to public and congressional demands
concerning cloning."); Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93
NEB. L. REV. 89, 97 (2014) [hereinafter Noah, Governance by the Backdoor] (discussing the FDA's use of
guidance documents).
53. Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable Care Act: Law and
Process, 39 J. HEALTI-I POL., PoL'Y, & L. 441, 459 (2014); see also Merrill, The Architecture, supra note 23, at
1864. But see Bagley & Levy, supra, at 459-60 ("This consensus, however, rests on an unflattering view of
administrative motivation.").
54. See, e.g., FDA, ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUG REQUIREMENTS
FOR USE OF FECAL MICROBIOTA FOR TRANSPLANTATION TO TREAT CLOSTRIDIUM DIFFICILE INFECTION NOT
RESPONSIVE
TO
STANDARD
TuERAPIES,
DRAFT
GUIDANCE
FOR
INDUSTRY
(2016),
http://www.fda.gov/rnedia/96562/download [https://perrna.ccNS6H-MBXU]. This March 2016 Draft Guidance
contains a header that reads "Contains Nonbinding Recommendations." Id. at 1 ("This draft guidance, when
finalized, will represent the current thinking of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Agency) on this
topic. It does not establish any rights for any person and is not binding on FDA or the public. You can use an
alternative approach if it satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations."). For more FDA
documents containing similar language emphasizing their nonbinding effect, see also FDA, QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS ON BIOSIMILAR DEVELOPMENT AND THE BPCI ACT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY l (2018),
http://www.fda.gov/rnedia/119258/download [https://perma.cc/UW5C-4CNF]; FDA, supra note 9, at l; FDA,
SAME SURGICAL PROCEDURE EXCEPTION UNDER 21 CFR 1271.15(B): QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING
11-!E SCOPE OF THE EXCEPTION: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 1 (2017), http://www.fda.gov/rnedia/89920/download
[https://perma.cc/G8RZ-YR5R]. See supra note 9 for more on the term "minimal manipulation" as used in FDA
re gulations, FDA actions (including the regulation of autologous stern cell treatments), and FDA guidance
documents. The FDA does have a process for soliciting public input on certain guidance documents; however,
many of the FDA's assertions of jurisdiction over certain innovative therapies are not announced through
documents that are labeled as " guidance documents" even though they are not regulations. See, e.g.,
Opportunities for Input into Guidance Development, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/rnedia/82966/download
[https://perma.cc/R5SL-UTCX] (last visited Feb. 1, 2020). For more on the FDA's use of guidance documents
and how that use minimizes the strength of procedural safeguards, see, for example, Noah, Governance by the
Backdoor, supra note 52, at 90-93.
55. See supra notes 49-50. For more on the FDA actions to expand its jurisdiction, see generally Lars
Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 902 (2008) [hereinafter Noah, Little Agency That Couldj.
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technologies in the United States.56 Further, sometimes these effective bans occur during
the development stage so as to limit innovation in the first place.57 Such limitations tend
to lead to the medical tourism described in the introduction of this Article; this medical
tourism imposes significant costs financially, informationally, and in terms of access to
healthcare. Overall, as Part II.A discusses, at least two problems plague the federal
regulatory regime: (1) motivations based on political objections to certain forms of
experimentation, such as those related to human embryos; and (2) failure to acknowledge
the existence of a medical procedure that would thus be subject to state jurisdiction.58
Although the FDA is statutorily empowered to regulate products, it does not have
that same statutory jurisdiction over the practice of medicine.59 As the next Part
describes, the regulation of the practice of medicine has traditionally fallen within the
province of individual states.
B. State Jurisdiction over the Practice of Medicine

This Part builds upon the prevailing view of "courts, medical practitioners, and
Congress [who] have not viewed the federal govermnent-and the one-size-fits-all
approach that may come with it-as a natural fit for regulating medical practice" because
states regulate the practice of medicine.60 The primacy of states in the regulation of
medicine and the repeated statements that Congress did not intend the FDCA to regulate
the practice of medicine can be found throughout the legislative histories of various
amendments to the FDCA.61

56. See, e.g., Merrill & Rose, supra note 17, at 88.
57. In prior works, I have focused on the FDA's continued regulation of certain forms of assisted
reproductive technology as medical products, even though the FDA does not regulate in vitro fertilization, the
method of assisted reproductive technology that is common to all of these procedures. See Lewis, Halted
Innovation, supra note 9, at 1086-1110; Lewis, How Subterranean, supra note 17, at 1251--65 (explaining the
limits on FDA authority over assisted reproductive technology methods that combine in vitro fertilization with
genetic modification and tracing the FDA's expansion of jurisdiction over various reproductive technology
techniques).
58. See infra note 84.
59. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) ("Indeed, a recent
amendment to the FDCA expressly states in part that '[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device
to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.' Thus,
the FDA is charged with the difficult task of regulating the marketing and distribution of medical devices without
intruding upon decisions statutorily committed to the discretion of health care professionals." (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)); see also infra notes 62--65.
60. Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight ofMedicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 438
(2015) [hereinafter Zettler, Toward Coherent]. For examples of state statutes regulating the practice of medicine,
see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.311 (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 112, § 6 (West 2019). See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text for an overview of state statutes
regulating the practice of medicine.
61. See, e.g., Regulation of Diethylstilbestrol (DES) (Its Use as a Drug for Humans and in Animal Feeds):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 92d Cong. 103 (1971) (statement of then
General Counsel of the FDA, Peter Barton Hutt) ("There is no question that FDA is authorized to approve the
safety and effectiveness for all dmgs. . . . On the other hand, the legislative history of both [the 1938 Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and the 1962 amendments] flatly states that FDA is not authorized to regulate the practice of
medicine by requiring that physicians do or do not use specific drugs only in specific ways.").

398

TEMPLE LAW REVIE W

[Vol. 92

States have a longstanding role as regulators for the benefit of the public health,
including through the regulation of the practice of medicine.62 Historically, as the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted, "the several States have exercised their police powers to
protect the health and safety of their citizens . . . [b]ecause these are 'primarily, and
historically, . . . matter[s] of local concern. "'63 In the states, "[ t]he application of police
power has traditionally implied a capacity to . . . promote the public health, morals, or
safety, and the general well-being of the community" and to "enact and enforce laws" to
that end. 64 In light of these longstanding duties, for example, all states and the District of
Columbia have medical boards and health departments.65
As such, the "practice of medicine" is a part of the historic state police powers over
public health and safety.66 Over time, states have defined "the practice of medicine"
statutorily, especially in connection with statutes that identify who may or may not
legally "practice medicine."67 While each state has its own statute defining the "practice
of medicine," statutory definitions typically include:
(1) diagnosing, preventing, treating, and curing disease; (2) holding oneself
out to the public as able to perform the above; (3) intending to receive a gift,
fee, or compensation for the above; (4) attaching such titles as "M.D." to one's
name; (5) maintaining an office for reception, examination, and treatment;
(6) performing surgery; and (7) using, administering, or prescribing drugs or
medicinal preparations.68
1.

States as Patient Protectors and Gatekeepers to the Medical Profession

States govern the practice of medicine by imposing requirements for the licensing
of medical professionals and administering malpractice regimes.69 For example, all states

62. See Ross D. Silverman, Regulating Medical Practice in the Cyber Age: Issues and Challenges for
StateMedical Boards, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 255, 256 (2000).
63. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (second alteration and second omission in original)
(quoting Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)); see also id. at 485;
Silverman, supra note 62, at 256.
64. Jorge E. Galva et al., Public Health Strategy and the Police Power of the State, 120 PUB. HEALTI-!
REP. I, 20 (Supp. 1 2005); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). For more on the American
medical profession and the origins of the physician licensure regime, see PAUL STARR, TuE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 39-47, 57-59 (1982).
65. James N. Thompson & Lisa A. Robin, StateMedical Boards: Future Challenges for Regulation and
Quality Enhancement ofMedical Care, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 93, 94 (2012); State Health Departments, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTI-! & HUM. SERVS., http://healthfinder.gov/FindServices/SearchContext.aspx?show = l &topic=820
[https://perrna.cc/E56A-TN8L] (last visited Feb. I, 2020).
66. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTI-! LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 87 (7th ed. 2013 ).
67. See, e.g., Michael H. Cohen, Holistic Health Care: Including Alternative and Complementary
Medicine in Insurance and Regulatory Schemes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 90 (1996).
68. Id. (citing Michael H. Cohen, A Fixed Star in Health Care Reform: The Emerging Paradigm of
Holistic Healing, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79, 97-98, 157-59 app. I tbl.2 (1995) (providing state statutes defining the
practice of medicine and categorizing state statutes by the provisions contained in their definitions of the
"practice of medicine")).
69. See, e.g., FURROW ET AL., supra note 66, at 87; see also Lori B. Andrews, The Shadow Health Care
System: Regulation of Alternative Health Care Providers, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1273, 1298-1308 (1996) (discussing
state definitions of the "practice of medicine" and prosecutions for the unauthorized practice of medicine).

2020]

INNOVATING FEDERALISM IN THE LIFE SCIENCES

399

have physician licensure statutes, generally administered through state medical boards. 70
Licensed physicians are then able to prescribe drugs that the federal govermnent has
approved. 7 1 Individuals who the state has not licensed to practice medicine are therefore
subject to prosecution for the unauthorized practice of medicine. 72 State medical boards
also discipline medical practitioners "that cease to be competent" as identified through
various methods, including complaints by members of the public. 73 In addition to
licensing healthcare professionals, states also license hospitals and other institutions that
provide healthcare. 74
Medical malpractice regimes allow patients to hold physicians liable under state
tort law for breaches of the standard of care in their treatment. 75 Medical malpractice
reform continues to be a topic of discussion at both the state and federal levels of
govermnent, although medical malpractice liability only exists at the state level.76
Although states still face difficulties in characterizing actions as part of (or outside
of) the "practice of medicine," such as when determining whether alternative medicine
practitioners or healthcare professionals subordinate to physicians are practicing
medicine, the "practice of medicine" marks a general demarcation of state jurisdiction in
the context of current and forthcoming innovative therapies and medicine in general. 77
70. FURROW ET AL.• supra note 66. at 87; see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost. Oversight of the Quality of
Medical Care: Regulation,Management, or theMarket?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 828, 833, 862 (1995).
71. See Cohen, supra note 67, at 90.
72. See, e.g., id. at 85.
73. See Jost, supra note 70, at 861, 867.
74. See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Tackling the "Evils" of Interlocking Directorates in Healthcare
Nonprofits, 85 NEB. L. REV. 681, 687-89, 705-06 (2007); Sandra H. Johnson, Quality-Control Regulation of
Home Health Care, 26 Hous. L. REV. 901, 922-41 (1989).
75. See David M. Studdert et al.,MedicalMalpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 283, 287 (2004); see
also Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 391, 398-99 (2005) (discussing state medical malpractice awards).
76. See, e.g., Beverly Cohen, Disentangling EMTALA from MedicalMalpractice: Revising EMTALA 's
Screening Standard To Differentiate Between Ordinary Negligence and Discriminatory Denials of Care, 82
TuL. L. REV. 645, 661-62 (2007) ("Courts have unanimously agreed that [the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act's (EMTALA)] screening requirement does not create a federal cause of action akin to
medical malpractice. . . . Further, EMTALA expressly states that it is not intended to preempt state laws unless
they directly conflict with EMTALA. This preemption provision forecloses any argument that EMTALA is
intended to preempt state malpractice law." (footnote omitted)); Michelle M. Mello et al., Medical
Liability Prospects for Federal Reform, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1806, 1806 (2017). See generally Karen
Stockley, How Do Changes inMedicalMalpractice Liability Laws Affect Health Care Spending and the Federal
Budget? (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 2019-03, 2019), http://www.cbo.gov/system/files/201904/55104-Medical%20Malpractice_WP.pdf [https://perrna.cc/GAA2-L88F] (discussing the impact of medical
malpractice reform on federal spending).
77. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 66, at 104-24; Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitinents to Federalism
in Controlling the Practice ofMedicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 161--65 (2004) (discussing the difficulties that
arise in defining the "practice of medicine," including determining whether physicians who work in
administrative capacities, such as for health insurers or as expert witnesses, are engaged in the practice of
medicine, and whether nonphysicians, including laypeople or "[u]nless they are exempted under separate scope
of-practice legislation, nurses, pharmacists, and other licensed health care professionals whose conduct crosses
the line into the practice of medicine," are engaged in the unauthorized practice of medicine); see also Elizabeth
Y. McCuskey, Body of Preemption: Health Law Traditions and the Presumption Against Preemption, 89 TEMP.
L. REV. 95, 108 (2016) [hereinafter McCuskey, Body of Preemption] ("Courts have a distinct presumption
against preemption for topics covered by state police powers, based on an ostensible tradition of state regulatory

400

TEMPLE LAW REVIE W

[Vol. 92

Additionally, even though pharmaceuticals and medical devices must obtain premarket
approval from the FDA before they can be legally marketed and sold in the United States,
state law protects patients by providing tort remedies for failure-to-warn and
design-defect claims, with limitations imposed by Supreme Court decisions related to
brand name and generic drugs.78 These state law protections are necessary complements
to federal regulation because, as the Supreme Court majority in Wyeth v. Levine79 noted,
[t]he FDA has limited resources to monitor the 1 1,000 drugs on the market,
and manufacturers have superior access to information about their drugs,
especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks emerge. State tort suits
uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug manufacturers
to disclose safety risks promptly.80
Thus, state law complements federal law, which focuses on premarketing approval, by
focusing on the adverse consequences of using FDA-approved products after they are on
the market.
Even with the FDA's jurisdiction over the products used in the practice of medicine,
various statutory provisions (and regulations repeating those directives) state that the
current federal regulatory structure does not overrule state jurisdiction over the practice
of medicine.8 1 Similar restrictions exist in other federal statutes related to healthcare,
including those governing Medicaid, Medicare, and fertility clinic success rate reporting
requirements.82 Against that backdrop, physicians, within the practice of medicine, can

primacy over those topics." (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp.. Inc.. 505 U.S. 504. 518 (1992))); Zettler. Toward
Coherent. supra note 60. at 435-37.
78. See Catherine M. Sharkey. States Versus FDA. 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1609. 1613-14 (2015)
[hereinafter Sharkey. States Versus FDA]; see also Wyeth v. Levine. 555 U.S. 555. 578-79. 581 (2009) (holding
that Levine's failure-to-warn claims under state tort law. for her injury by the brand-name drug Phenergan. were
not preempted by federal FDA approvals). But see Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett. 570 U.S. 472. 475-76 (2013)
(holding the state law was without effect because it imposed a duty "not to comply with federal law"); PLIVA.
Inc. v. Mensing. 564 U.S. 604. 617-18 (2011). The current tension between federal labeling regulations and
state tort law. as a result of state preemption doctrine and the FDA's labeling regulations. is a topic large enough
for a separate article.
79. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
80. Wyeth. 555 U.S. at 578-79 (footnote omitted).
81. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2018) ("Nothing in this chapter [of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act] shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or
administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care
practitioner-patient relationship."); id. § 903 ("No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating
an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal
penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the
authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State
law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.").
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2018) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal
officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which
medical services are provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer or employee of any
institution, agency, or person providing health services; or to exercise any supervision or control over the
administration or operation of any such institution, agency, or person."); see also id. § 263a-2(i)( l)-(2) ("In
developing the certification program, the Secretary may not establish any regulation, standard, or requirement
which has the effect of exercising supervision or control over the practice of medicine in assisted reproductive
technology programs."); id. § 416 ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the
Commissioner of Social Security or any other officer or employee of the United States to interfere in any way
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prescribe FDA-approved drugs for off-label uses (although manufacturers cannot market
them for those uses). States are not, however, permitted to overrule the FDA's approval
of products, and historical state efforts to "limit or entirely bar access" to contraceptives
that were FDA approved, for example, have been invalidated by the Supreme Court. 83
2.

State Interests in Medical Innovation

States already innovate in the absence of federal govermnent action or in response
to federal governmental action that is contrary to the preferences of states' citizenries. 84
For example, in response to a ban on the federal funding of research involving human
embryos, California specifically enacted legislation to regulate and fund stem cell
research that could not obtain federal funding. 85 In 20 17, California also enacted a new
law outlining informed consent requirements that were specifically applicable to stem
cell treatments that had not been FDA approved. 86 Additionally, many states that house
centers for biotechnology innovation or research centers that receive significant amounts
of federal and private funding, like Maryland, which is the site of Johns Hopkins
University, have robust human subjects research regimes that supplement the federal
govermnent's human subjects protection regulations. 87 Maryland also has a Stem Cell
Research Fund, which was created by statute in 2006 in response to federal funding
restrictions on stem cell research announced during President George W. Bush' s
administration. 88 Thus, state regulation and funding are important complements to
federal regulation.
with the practice of medicine or with relationships between practitioners of medicine and their patients, or to
exercise any supervision or control over the administration or operation of any hospital.").
83. See, e.g., Noah, State Affronts, supra note 27, at 16; see id. at 17-23 (describing state efforts to limit
access to products approved by the FDA); id. at 3-16 (describing Massachusetts's effort to limit access to
Zohydro, an opioid, without an "abuse-resistant formulation"); see also Sharkey, States Versus FDA, supra note
78, at 1615-24.
84. For more on the state interest in accelerating access to pharmaceuticals, see supra note 37, discussing
state right-to-try laws, which preceded federal right-to-try legislation.
85. See June Calbone, Negating the Genetic Tie: Does the Law Encourage Unnecessary Risks?, 79
UMKC L. REV. 333, 360 (2010). For more on the federal limitations on embryonic stern cell research, see
generally Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 779-80 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (comparing the federal treatment of
embryonic stern cell research funding in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidential administrations).
86. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 684(b)(l) (West 2019) ("A health care practitioner licensed under this
division who performs a stern cell therapy that is not FDA-approved shall communicate to a patient seeking stern
cell therapy the following information in English: 'THIS NOTICE MUST BE PROVIDED TO YOU UNDER
CALIFORNIA LAW. This health care practitioner performs one or more stern cell therapies that have not yet
been approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration. You are encouraged to consult with your
primary care physician prior to undergoing a stern cell therapy."'). This law also involves monetary penalties
for multiple instances of noncompliance and a requirement that the Medical Board of California publish
information related to legal and disciplinary action applicable to licensed health care practitioners who provide
stern cell therapies. Id. § 684(d).
87. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-2002 (West 2019); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 111525 (West 2019) (requiring and defining the role of consent "[p]rior to prescribing or administering
an experimental drug"); Balbara A. Noah, BioethicalMalpractice: Risk and Responsibility in Human Research,
7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & PoL'Y 175, 214 n.168 (2004).
88. See About Us, MD. STEM CELL RESEARCH FUND, http://www.rnscrf.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/F8HS-4Q6N] (last visited Feb. 1, 2020) ("[Established b]y the Governor and the Maryland
General Assembly through the Maryland Stern Cell Research Act of 2006 . . . . The purpose of the Fund is to
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C. Hybrid Jurisdiction: The Practice-Products Distinction in the Context of Innovative
Therapies

A hybrid regime of life sciences regulation, as opposed to a federally focused one,
would better regulate many current and forthcoming innovations. This Part provides brief
overviews of innovative therapies that would be amenable to a cooperative governance
structure. The innovative therapies discussed in this Part all require state regulation over
the practice of medicine and federal regulation of the drugs, biologics, and/or
combination products used in those innovative therapies.
1.

Gene Therapy

Gene therapy targets disease-causing genetic variations in an effort to "treat, cure
or prevent a disease or medical condition." 89 Specifically, gene therapy uses "vectors,"
such as viruses, to target genes that are defective or missing by inserting new genes into
a cell.90 The first human gene therapy clinical trial in the United States began in 1990.9 1
The trial included two patients, and scientists concluded after the completion of the trial
that '" gene therapy can be a safe and effective addition to treatment' for some people
born with severe combined immunodeficiency disease (SCID)."92 A number of other
human gene therapy trials ensued with many revealing medical promise and others
revealing safety concerns that scientists and researchers drew upon when developing
subsequent gene therapy protocols.93
On September 17, 1999, four days after beginning a gene therapy treatment in a
clinical trial at the University of Pennsylvania to ascertain the safety and effectiveness
of using a specific gene therapy protocol to treat babies with a fatal form of ornithine
transcarbamylase (OTC) deficiency, Jesse Gelsinger died.94 At least one commentator
noted that this marked the beginning of a "perilous time for gene therapy," and it was not

promote state-funded stern cell research and cures through grants and loans to public and private entities in the
state. To date we supported 460 awards with $156 million."); see also 0. Carter Snead. The Pedagogical
Significance of the Bush Stem Cell Policy: A Window into Bioethical Regulation in the United States. 5 YALE J.
HEALTI-! PoL'Y. L.. & Ernrcs 491. 492 & n.4 (2005) (describing the reaction of states to President Bush's stern
cell research funding policy).
89. What Is Gene Therapy? How Does It Work?. FDA. http://www.fda.gov/consurners/consurner
updates/what-gene-therapy-how-does-it-work [https ://perrna.cc/AU6A-YXL4] (last updated Dec. 22. 2017).
90. Id.; see also How Does Gene Therapy Work?. NAT'L INSTS. HEALTI-I (Oct. 1. 2019).
http://ghr.nlrn.nih.gov/prirner/therapy/procedures [https://perrna.cc/Z8NJ-H4MB].
91. Results from First Human Gene Therapy Clinical Trial. NAT'L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Oct. 19.
1995). http://www.genorne.gov/l 0000521/1995-release-first-hurnan-gene-therapy-results [https://perrna.cc/
K5EB-BTHM].
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Biotech Death of Jesse Gelsinger, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 28,
1999), http://www.nytirnes.corn/1999/11/28/rnagazine/the-biotec h-death-of-j esse-gelsinger.html [https:/ /
perrna.cc/JPW8-UR7S].
94. See id. ("Typically, newborns [with severe OTC deficiency] slip into a coma within 72 hours of birth.
Most suffer severe brain damage. Half die in the first month, and half of the survivors die by age 5."). For more
on the Jesse Gelsinger gene therapy trial, see Melinda Wenner, Gene Therapy: An Interview with an Unfortunate
Pioneer, Ser. AM. (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.scientificarnerican.com/article/gene-therapy-an
interview/?redirect=1 [https ://perrna.cc/WMU8-YK6Z].
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until 2017 that the FDA approved the first gene therapy product for marketing and use
in humans.95
In October 20 18, at a plenary session held during the "FDA: Past, Present, and
Future" Conference at American University, former chief counsels of the FDA discussed
their opinions on "controversial topics," including what they thought "about the agency
and its efforts . . . in gene therapy."96 Two of the former chief counsels had laudatory
views on the FDA's work, with one noting that the FDA was doing a "good job" with
these (and other) modem technologies in general and the other praising the agency's
work in approving CAR-T therapies, a type of gene therapy.97 Another, however, noted
the commissioner was wrestling with
the jurisdictional and practical challenges of selling gene therapy . . . . [W]hen
you're talking about individual therapy . . . for a particular person that is not a
conventional drug or biologic, . . . I'm not sure that the current authorities and
the current statute are really adequate to . . . enable the agency to wrestle with
those issues. [The FDA] has done the best it can . . . and obviously it had to
respond when there was a death . . . at the University of Pennsylvania [in
reference to Jesse Gelsinger], . . . early . . . [in] gene therapy [research,] . . . but
I do think that all of these emerging technologies are a real challenge for an
agency.98
The jurisdictional challenges of gene therapy have become more prevalent due to recent
scientific promise (as opposed to previously failed trials) and recent approvals.99
In 1993, the FDA announced through the Federal Register that it would regulate
gene therapy as a biological product or drug. 100 In spite of the federally focused regime

95. See News Release. U.S. Food & Drug Adrnin.. FDA Approval Brings First Gene Therapy to the
United States (Aug. 30. 2017). http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucm574058.htm [https://perrna.cc/4J9W-TNRP]; Stolberg. supra note 93; see also Gene-Therapy Trials Must
Proceed with Caution. 534 NATURE 590. 590 (2016).
96. Plenary Session 2. supra note 18. at 48:14; see FDA: Past, Present, and Future, AM. U. WASH. C.L.
(Oct. 19, 2018), http://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/initiatives-programs/health/events/fdaconfl8/agenda/
[https://perrna.cc/3LC9-EBMP] (listing the four participating former chief counsels in Plenary Session 2 as
Richard Cooper, Peter Barton Hutt, Gerald Masoudi, and Daniel Troy). For more on the role of the FDA Office
of the Chief Counsel, see Office of the Chief Counsel, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
OC/OfficeoftheChiefCounsel/default.htm [https://perma.cc/A5KK-8Q4F] (last updated Mar. 28, 2018).
97. Plenary Session 2, supra note 18, at 48:18 (containing comments of Peter Barton Hutt, former Chief
Counsel of the FDA and stating, in response to the question of how the FDA was handling the issue of gene
therapy: "[W]e can go through all modem technology and say the same thing: I think they're doing a good job");
see also id. at 49:35 (containing comments of Gerald Masoudi, former Chief Counsel of the FDA, lauding the
FDA's actions in relation to CAR-T therapies). For more on CAR-T therapies, which are types of
immunotherapy that "collect[] and us[e] patients' own immune cells to treat their cancer," see CAR T
Cells: Engineering Patients' Immune Cells To Treat Their Cancers, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTI-I, NAT'L CANCER
INST., http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/research/car-t-cells [https://perma.cc/TW9G-4WJT] (last
updated July 30, 2019).
98. See Plenary Session 2, supra note 18, at 48:27 (providing comments of Daniel Troy, former Chief
Counsel of the FDA).
99. See infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of several gene therapy products the
FDA recently approved.
100. Application of Current Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic Cell Therapy Products and Gene
Therapy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,248, 53,251 (Oct. 14, 1993), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/UCM148113.pdf [https://perrna.cc/687W-3DS9] ("Gene therapy is
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used to regulate gene therapy, gene therapy involves both a federally regulated product
and the state-regulated practice of medicine due to the combination of a gene-modifying
product with a therapy tailored for an individual patient.101 Until recently, there had been
little debate over the FDA's jurisdiction over gene therapy, possibly because it was not
necessary due to its various failures-including, most notably, the death of Jesse
Gelsinger.102 It was not until 2017 when the FDA approved the first gene therapy
product, Kymriah, for marketing in the United States.103 Ultimately, tile FDA approved
a total of three gene therapy products in 20 17: (1) Kymriah, to treat "certain pediatric
and young adult patients with a form of acute lymphoblastic leukemia"; 104 (2) Yescarta,
"to treat adult patients with certain types of large B-cell lymphoma who have not
responded to or who have relapsed after at least two other kinds of treatment''; 105 and
(3) Luxturna, to treat "inherited form of vision loss that may result in blindness." 106
Scientists expect that new gene therapies can improve the treatment of leukemia and
potentially cure certain forms of blindness and inherited blood disorders.107
The aforementioned approved gene fuerapy products were all approved as
biologics.108 The gene therapy of the infamous, failed clinical trial that Jesse Gelsinger
a medical intervention based on modification of the genetic material of living cells. Cells may be modified ex
vivo for subsequent administration or may be altered in vivo by gene therapy products given directly to the
subject. . . . The genetic manipulation may be intended to prevent. treat. cure. diagnose. or mitigate disease or
injuries in humans . . . . Final products containing the genetic material intended for gene therapy are regulated as
biological products requiring PLA's (e.g.. viral vectors containing genetic material to be transferred. ex vivo
transduced cells and analogous products) or as dmgs requiring NDA's (e.g.. synthetic products) . . . .").
IOI. See Francis S. Collins & Scott Gottlieb. The Next Phase of Human Gene-Therapy Oversight. 379
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1393. 1393-95 (2018) (detailing the role of the FDA and the NIH. each a federal body. in
regulation of gene therapy products). See supra notes 59--67 and accompanying text for an overview of the
state's regulatory authority over the practice of medicine.
102. See, e.g., Collins & Gottlieb, supra note IOI, at 1393-95; Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Death of Jesse
Gelsinger: New Evidence of the Influence ofMoney and Prestige in Human Research, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 295,
301 (2010); Gene-Therapy TrialsMust Proceed with Caution, supra note 95, at 590. But see Jacob S. Sherkow
et al., Is It 'Gene Therapy'?, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 786, 789 (2018) (discussing the difficulties of defining gene
therapy and noting that "[a]ttempts to define 'gene therapy' waned after the 1999 death of Jesse Gelsinger, a
clinical trial subject" (citing Jennifer Couzin & Jocelyn Kaiser.As Gelsinger Case Ends, Gene Therapy Suffers
Another Blow, 307 Ser. 1028, 1028 (2005))); id. ("Second, other definitions of gene therapy-such as FDA's
are so broad as to be essentially meaningless.").
103. See News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 95.
104. Id.
105. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves CAR-T Cell Therapy To Treat Adults
with Certain Types of Large B-cell Lymphoma (Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.fda.gov/news-events/press
announcements/fda-approves-car-t-cell-therapy-treat-adults-certain-types-large-b-cell-lymphoma
[https://perrna.cc/2VSQ-5EYC].
106. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Novel Gene Therapy To Treat Patients
with a Rare Form of Inherited Vision Loss (Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.fda.gov/news-events/press
announcements/fda-approves-novel-gene-therapy-treat-patients-rare-form-inherited-vision-loss
[https://perma.cc/G854-E3FU].
107. See, e.g., Rob Stein, Gene Therapy for InheritedBlood Disorder Reduced Transfusions, NPR (Apr.
18, 2018, 5:0 I PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/04/18/602914728/gene-therapy-for
inherited-blood-disorder-reduced-transfusions [https ://perma.cc/U6WR-GM6W].
108. See Letter from Wilson W. Bryan, Dir., Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin.,
to
Dr.
Manisha
Patel,
Novartis
Phann.
Corp.
(Aug.
30,
2017),
http://www.fda.gov/media/106989/download [https://perrna.cc/Q9GS-BLVD] (granting Biologics License
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participated in involved the use of a viral vector to "deliver corrective genes" in order to
test the safety (and not the efficacy) of gene therapy to treat "a [rare] liver deficiency." 109
Just as with pharmaceutical products, monitoring is essential in gene therapy
trials: "Monitoring lies 'at the heart of the matter,' sa[id] Dr. Philip Noguchi, the FDA's
[former] director of the Division of Cellular and Gene Therapies. 'And that's not
something the FDA can do alone. "' 110 Additionally, the FDA admitted that its monitoring
was "sometimes 'less than adequate "' in the past. l l l
Of the innovative therapies discussed in this Article, gene therapy has existed for
the longest time. 112 The regulation of gene therapy could provide a "floor" for the federal
regulation of forthcoming innovative therapies although the regulation of gene therapy
still suffers from the problem that politics could still manifest in the regulatory process. 113
2.

Gene Editing, Including CRISPR-Cas9

Gene editing is a versatile technology that is the subject of much attention and
excitement due to the possibility that it could cure or prevent the inheritance of genetic

Application (BLA) approval for Kynniah); Letter from Mary A. Malarkey & Wilson W. Bryan. Dirs.. Ctr. for
Biologics Evaluation & Research. U.S. Food & Drug Adrnin.. to Rizwana F. Sproule. Kite Pharma. Inc. (Oct.
18. 2017). http://www.fda.gov/media/108458/download [https://perma.cc/7V6P-CZJP] (granting BLA approval
for Yescarta); Letter from Mary A. Malarkey & Wilson W. Bryan. Dirs.. Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation &
Research. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.. to Jim Wang. Spark Therapeutics. Inc. (Dec. 19. 2017).
http://www.fda.gov/media/109487/download [https://perma.cc/4SH4-ABJM] (granting BLA approval for
Luxtuma).
109. Wilson. supra note 102. at 298; see also Stolberg. supra note 93.
l l0. Barbara Sibbald. Death but One Unintended Consequence of Gene-Therapy Trial. 164 CAN. MED.
Ass'N J. 1612. 1612 (2001); see also Nina A. Mendelson. A Presumption Against Agency Preemption. 102 Nw.
U. L. REV. 695. 698 (2008).
I l l. Sibbald. supra note l l0. at 1612; see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE. GAO-06-402.
DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA' S POS1MARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS I
(2006). http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CFA-JQQL] ("FDA lacks clear and
effective processes for making decisions about. and providing management oversight of. postmarket safety
issues."); Gillian E. Metzger. Federalism and Federal Agency Reform. 111 COLUM. L. REV. I. 29-31 (2011)
[hereinafter Metzger. Federalism]; supra notes 19-21 (discussing political and social influences on FDA
regulatory decisions).
112. See, e.g., NAT'L ACADS. Sers., ENG'G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND
GOVERNANCE 65 (2017), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK447268/ [https://perma.cc/PE6R-MYV5]
("The past 5 years have seen the development of a completely novel system, known as CRISPR/Cas9 (CRISPR
stands for clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats)."); Angelo S. Mao & David J. Mooney,
RegenerativeMedicine: Current Therapies and Future Directions, l l 2 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Ser. U.S. 14,452,
14,452 (2015) (observing that "tissue engineering and regenerative medicine emerged as an industry about two
decades ago"); Gene Therapy, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH, http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/genetics/sect4.htm
[https://perma.cc/2MP7-L 73K] (last visited Feb. I, 2020) (providing the NIH's timeline, "Timeline Telling the
Story of Developing the First Human Gene Therapy," a timeline of the development of gene therapy treatments,
which began in 1985). See also infra note 13 I for the statement of former commissioner Gottlieb on regenerative
medicine therapies.
113. See, e.g., Javitt & Hudson, supra note 17, at 1214-15; see also What Are the Ethical Concerns of
Genome Editing?, NAT'L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/27569225/what-are-the-ethical
concems-about-genome-editing/ [https://perrna.cc/85HC-6RDX] (last updated Aug. 3, 2017) (discussing the
ethical concerns that arise as a result of human germline editing).
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disease instead of only treating disease symptoms. 114 Beyond its medical treatment uses,
gene editing is a technology with a myriad of uses, ranging from medical care to the
modification of animals, plants, and even "do-it-yourself' glow-in-the-dark beer. 115
Gene (or genome) editing "technologies . . . give scientists the ability to change an
organism's DNA. These technologies allow genetic material to be added, removed, or
altered at particular locations in the genome." 116 As the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) noted, "[t]he CRISPR-Cas9 system [of gene editing] has generated a lot of
excitement in the scientific community because it is faster, cheaper, more accurate, and
more efficient than other existing genome editing methods." 1 17 Similarly, in a jointly
authored article in the New England Journal of Medicine, the NIH Director and the
now-former FDA Commissioner observed that CRISPR-Cas9 was a "quantum leap
forward" in the ability of scientists to edit genes.118 CRISPR-Cas9 could possibly cure
or prohibit the inheritance of a vast array of diseases with genetic causes, including
Tay-Sachs disease, sickle cell anemia, muscular dystrophy, neurofibromatosis, and
cystic fibrosis. 1 19 CRISPR-Cas9 could also target certain genetic mutations that increase
the risk of individuals contracting diseases such as cancer and Alzheimer's.120
114. See George Q. Daley et al., After the Storm A Responsible Path for Genome Editing, 380 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 897, 899 (2019); Donald B. Kohn et al., Ethical and Regulatory Aspects of Genome Editing, 127
BLOOD 2553, 2553, 2556 (2016).
l l5. See, e.g., Klaus Rajewsky, The Historical Scientifi c Context, in INTERNATIONAL SUMMIT ON HUMAN
GENE
EDITING
6-8
(2015),
http://nationalacadernies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/
webpage/pga_170455.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUR5-YQWS]; Molly Olmstead, The Fuzzy Regulations
Surrounding DIY Synthetic Biology, SLATE (May 4, 2017, 10:52 AM), http://slate.com/technology/2017/05/the
fuzzy-regulations-surrounding-diy-synthetic-biology.htrnl [https://perma.cc/2CMC-UH8D].
l l6. See What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9?, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTI-! (Oct. 1, 2019),
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genornicresearch/genomeediting [https:/ /perma.cc/CXT7-4B7X].
117. Id.; see also Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, CRISPR and Dogs and Cats,
51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2303, 2327-28 (2018) (referring to CRISPR-Cas9 as "the Model T of DNA editing").
The NIH explains the CRISPR-Cas9 method of genome editing as follows:
CRISPR-Cas9 . . . is short for clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats and CRISPR
associated protein 9.
. . . [With t]he CRISPR-Cas9 system . . . [, r]esearchers create a small piece of RNA with a short
"guide" sequence that attaches (binds) to a specific target sequence of DNA in a genome. The RNA
also binds to the Cas9 enzyme. As in bacteria, the modified RNA is used to recognize the DNA
sequence, and the Cas9 enzyme cuts the DNA at the targeted location. Although Cas9 is the enzyme
that is used most often, other enzymes (for example Cpfl ) can also be used. Once the DNA is cut,
researchers use the cell's own DNA repair machinery to add or delete pieces of genetic material, or
to make changes to the DNA by replacing an existing segment with a customized DNA sequence.
What Are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9?, supra note l l6.
l l8. See, e.g., Collins & Gottlieb, supra note 101, at 1394.
l l9. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, Scientists Unveil the 'Most Clever CRISPR Gadget' So Far, STAT (Apr.
20, 2016), http://www.statnews.corn/2016/04/20/clever-crispr-advance-unveiled/ [https://perma.cc/4T3T
YMGG]; Berly McCoy, CRISPR Gene-Editing 'Eliminates' HIV in Some Mice. What Does It Mean for
Humans?, PBS (July 2, 2019, 5:40 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/crispr-gene-editing-elirninates
hiv-in-some-rnice-what-does-it-mean-for-humans [https://perma.cc/668C-6SFK]. But see Eric S. Lander, What
We Don't Know, in INTERNATIONAL SUMMIT ON HUMAN GENE EDITING, supra note l l 5, at 20-27 ("[I]f we
really care about helping parents avoid cases of genetic disease, germline editing is not the first, second, third,
or fourth thing that we should be thinking about.").
120. See, e.g., Begley, supra note l l9.
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Current options for delivering CRISPR-Cas9 into the human body include a topical
gel, "a drinkable or edible CRISPR probiotic," direct injections, skin grafts, or an
injection of modified cells into the human body. 121 Viral vectors are commonly used,
and nanotechnology, another developing field, has also been proposed as a method of
delivering the CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing system into the body. 122 A physician would
have to administer or prescribe all of these aforementioned techniques of delivering
CRISPR-Cas9 into the body, thus involving the practice of medicine. The use of
CRISPR-Cas9 would also still require significant monitoring. 123
Although CRISPR-Cas9 offers promise, it also has potential disadvantages, which
include off-target effects in which the editing of one gene leads to the unexpected
alteration of another gene that was not the target of the technology and the possibility of
an increased cancer risk. 124 While scientists continue to make advances that would
minimize some of the unintended negative consequences of using CRISPR-Cas9, the
discovery of additional possible negative impacts of gene editing is similar to the side
effects that are experienced by some users of pharmaceuticals but are addressed through
an information disclosure regime. Thus, just as with gene therapy, "monitoring lies ' at
the heart of the matter."' 125
CRISPR-Cas9 is an excellent candidate for state and federal regulation because it
will implicate both state and federal regulation due to its combination of the practice of
medicine and the use of federally regulated products. The gene editing system itself
implicates the state's regulatory authority over the practice of medicine, but the method
of "delivering" CRISPR-Cas9 into the human body would be subject to federal

121. Emily Mullin. Five Ways To Get CRJSPR into the Body. MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 22. 2017).
http://www.technologyreview.com/s/608898/five-ways-to-get-crispr-into-the-body/ [https://perma.cc/E4BLU43N].
122. See Anne Trafton. CRJSPR-Carrying Nanoparticles Edit the Genome. MIT NEWS (Nov. 13. 2017).
http://news.mit.edu/2017/crispr-carrying-nanoparticles-edit-genome-1113
[https://perma.cc/54T4-VQQZ];
FDA 's Approach to Regulation of Nanotechnology Products, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
ScienceResearch/Specia!Topics/Nanotechnology/ucm301114.htm [https://perrna.cc/LAB6-9PJ9] (last updated
Mar. 23, 2018).
123. CRISPR-Cas9 would differ from other non-over-the-counter pharmaceuticals as it would eventually
replace physicians in the treatment of many diseases by providing a cure instead of providing one of many
treatment tools that would require ongoing physician involvement. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 119. A future
article will focus on arguing for the regulatory treatment of gene editing similar to that of in vitro fertilization,
another treatment that physicians carry out and that often requires prescribed pharmaceuticals but that is
generally not regulated by the federal government.
124. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, CRJSPR-Edited Cells Linked to Cancer Risk in 2 Studies, Ser. AM. (June
12, 2018), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/crispr-edited-cells-linked-to-cancer-risk-in-2-studies/
[https:/ /perma.cc/S72U-4JS4] (republished from STAT News); Sharon Begley, CRJSPR 'Gone Wild' HasMade
Stocks Swoon, but Studies Show How To Limit OjfTarget Editing, STAT (Mar. 5, 2018),
http://www.statnews.corn/2018/03/05/crispr-off-target-editing/ [https://perma.cc/HSW7-9MZ7] ("The basic
reason for such 'off-target effects' is that CRISPR's guide molecule, which is usually 20 genetic letters long,
isn't as precise as often advertised."). But see id. ("'Progress is being made at a pretty stunning rate' . . . . A
parade of new discoveries . . . 'suggests that it's possible to use these genome-editing tools and not make
unintended edits."').
125. Sibbald, supra note l lO, at 1612. See also supra notes l l l -113 and accompanying text for an
analysis of the role of federal monitoring in the use of gene therapy.
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regulation as the method would require federally regulated products. 126 As the definition
of "biological product" includes a "virus, . . . vaccine, . . . or analogous
product . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of
human beings," viral methods of delivering CRISPR-Cas9 would fall at least partially
within the jurisdiction of the FDA. 127 Similarly, the definition of "drug," which includes
"articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease in man or other animals; and . . . articles (other than food) intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals" 128 would also likely cover
other CRISPR-Cas9 delivery methods such as a "drinkable or edible CRISPR
probiotic." 129
Additionally, gene editing is another technology that leads to extensive debate
related to the propriety of using assisted reproductive technology and also whether the
federal govermnent and other governments should aim to prevent the actual clinical use
of the technology when it would be used to modify embryos. 130 Thus, gene editing is
another innovative therapy that might lend itself toward nontransparent regulation by the
regulatory state based on political concerns as opposed to scientific concerns, in addition
to risk-averse regulation that could preclude innovation.
3.

Regenerative Medicine Therapies

Regenerative medicine is a broad "interdisciplinary field that applies engineering
and life science principles to promote regeneration, [which] can potentially restore
diseased and injured tissues and whole organs." 13 1 The use of stem cells, especially a
patient's own adult stem cells (autologous stem cells), as opposed to embryonic stem
cells, could aid in the treatment of various medical conditions including macular
degeneration, "regenerating bone . . . , developing insulin-producing cells for type 1
diabetes, and repairing damaged heart muscle following a heart attack with cardiac
muscle cells." 132
Even though the 2 1st Century Cures Act recognized a new category of "drug" called
a "regenerative advanced therapy," which is subject to an expedited approval pathway,
the FDA's "regenerative medicine advanced therapies" pathway still aims to fit

126. See supra Part LB for a discussion of state regulation of the practice of medicine. See also Mullin,
supra note 121 (discussing the various delivery techniques for CRISPR-Cas9).

127. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)( l ) (2018).
128. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)( l ) (2018).
129. Mullin, supra note 121.
130. See, e.g., Eric S. Lander et al., Adopt aMoratorium on Heritable Genome Editing, 567 NATURE 165,
168 (2019) (acknowledging scientific and ethical divisions over human gerrnline editing and advocating for
stricter regulation of the practice). A future article will discuss the bioethical debates related to assisted
reproductive technology (both at its inception and today), in addition to the bioethical debates that accompany
the regulation and use of gene editing.
131. See Mao & Mooney, supra note 112, at 14,452.
132. Stem Cell Information, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTI-I, http://sterncells.nih.gov/info/basics/4.htrn
[https://perma.cc/ZU9R-WMHS] (last visited Feb. 1, 2020); see also, e.g., Michiko Mandai et al., Autologous
Induced Stem-Cell-Derived Retinal Cells forMacular Degeneration, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1038, 1038 (2017).
Autologous stern cell treatments involve the use of a person's own stern cells as opposed to embryonic stern
cells.
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regenerative therapies into the category of a dmg. 133 Thus, the FDA (and Congress)
continue to apply an older regulatory system to products that the system was not created
to regulate (even with amendments). 134
As former FDA Commissioner Gottlieb noted in August 20 17, most cell therapies
as used in regenerative medicine "are in early stages of development." 135 Like the other
innovative therapies this Article discusses, regenerative stem cell therapies involve both
state and federal jurisdiction. Commissioner Gottlieb publicly acknowledged this aspect
of their regulation and noted that "it's incumbent upon the FDA to make sure that this
existing framework is properly defined, with bright lines separating new treatments that
are medical products subject to the FDA's regulation from those therapies that are
individualized by surgeons in such a way that they are not subject to FDA regulation." 136
Commissioner Gottlieb's statement thus alludes to the regulatory state in which the FDA
neither regulates surgeries nor therapies that surgeons individualize, as they are instead
subject to state regulation based on the state's police powers over the practice of
medicine. 137 Commissioner Gottlieb also acknowledged the "close calls" inherent in
drawing the line between medical practice and medical products in relation to
regenerative therapies. 138
Subterranean regulatory methods and slow-moving pathways have characterized
FDA regulation of innovative life sciences techniques. 139 The use of adult stem cells in
medical treatments (or other treatments advertised as stem cell therapies) has also led to
FDA enforcement actions against clinics providing those therapies that are harming
patients (along with express or implied threats of doing the same to other clinics). 140 In
133. See 21 U.S.C. § 356(g)(2) (stating that "[a] drug is eligible for designation as a regenerative advanced
therapy under this subsection if' the drug meets certain statutorily delineated conditions); id. § 356(g)(8) ("For
purposes of this section [providing expedited approval for regenerative advanced therapies]. the term
'regenerative medicine therapy• includes cell therapy. therapeutic tissue engineering products. human cell and
tissue products. and combination products using any such therapies or products. except for those regulated solely
under section 361 of the Public Health Service Act [42 U.S.C. § 264] and part 1271 of title 21. Code of Federal
Regulations." (alteration in original)); Regenerative Medicine Advanced Therapy Designation. FDA.
http://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/cellular-gene-therapy-products/regenerative-medicine-advanced
therapy-designation [https://perma.cc/FTA7-RW8X] (last updated May 17. 2019); see also FDA. EXPEDITED
PROGRAMS FOR REGENERATIVE MEDICINE TuERAPIES FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY
2-3 (2017). http://www.fda.gov/rnedia/120267/download [https://perma.cc/2D4B-MDQM].
134. See 21 U.S.C. § 356(g)(2) (allowing expedited review for drugs that are designated as regenerative
advanced therapies. as added by the 21st Century Cures Act); Hof fmann et al.. supra note 6. at 1390;
RegenerativeMedicine Advanced Therapy Designation. supra note 133.
135. Press Release. U.S. Food & Drug Adrnin.. supra note 12 (noting that those "technologies . . . hold
significant promise for transformative and potentially curative treatments for some of humanity• s most troubling
and intractable maladies").
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Nancy M. P. King, The Line Between Clinical Innovation and Human Experimentation, 32
SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 573-74, 580 (2002); see also Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at 8-10,
United States v. U.S. Stern Cell Clinic, LLC, No. 18-61047 (S.D. Fla. June 3, 2019) (discussing the " 'same
surgical procedure' exception" in FDA regulation (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1271.15(b) (2019))).
138. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Adrnin., supra note 12.
139. Lewis, Halted Innovation, supra note 9, at 1077, 1096.
140. See, e.g., George Q. Daley, Polar Extremes in the Clinical Use of Stem Cells, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1075, 1075-77 (2017) (discussing the Mandai study and the harms of many for-profit stern cell clinics in the
United States); Mandai et al., supra note 132, at 1038. One autologous stern cell treatment, Cultured Regenexx,
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these enforcement actions, the FDA targets clinics for selling or marketing adulterated
drugs and biologics under the FDCA and PHSA. 14 1 Nonetheless, clinics providing
autologous stem cell treatments continue to flourish in the United States, especially in
Florida, California, and Texas. 142

***
The hybrid innovative therapies discussed in this Section involve both state and
federal jurisdiction. This Article embraces the practice-products distinction and uses that
distinction as the basis for exploring a new regulatory structure for the life
sciences: state-federal cooperation as opposed to the current regime in which the federal
goveflllllent has usurped jurisdiction over the life sciences, thus ignoring state
jurisdiction. 143 Further, even if the practice-products distinction cannot be clearly made
in all cases, at least some aspect of innovative therapies involves the practice of medicine,
and cooperative federalism would be a useful governance structure as medicine continues
to evolve past its pharmaceutical- and physician-based foundations.
II. WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT REGIME AND NONCOOPERATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO
THE REGULATION OF lNNOVATIVE THERAPIES

This Section builds upon the preceding Section by explaining the weaknesses of the
current regime as applied to innovative therapies and the weaknesses of noncooperative
alternatives to the regulation of innovative therapies. Part II.A explains the weaknesses

was the subject of federal court litigation in 2014 that concluded that such an autologous stern cell treatment in
which a patient's own stern cells were combined with an antibiotic mixture was a mixture. subject to FDA
regulation. and not a procedure (which would fall wholly within the practice of medicine). See United States v.
Regenerative Scis.. LLC. 741 F.3d 1314. 1317. 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Lewis. Halted Innovation. supra
note 9. at 1098. 1105-08 (discussing United States v. Regenerative Sciences). For more on express and implied
threats in administrative law. see Lars Noah. Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authority. 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873. 876-98 [hereinafter Noah. Administrative Arm-Twisting]; Tim
Wu. Agency Threats. 60 DUKEL.J. 1841. 1842-43 (2011). For more on the FDA's use of threats as a regulatory
tool. see Noah. Administrative Arm-Twisting. supra. at 888-97.
141. See, e.g., Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 137, at 6-7; News Release, U.S.
Food & Drug Adrnin., FDA Acts To Remove Unproven, Potentially Harmful Treatment Used in 'Stern Cell'
Centers Targeting Vulnerable Patients (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.fda.gov/news-events/press
announcernents/fda-acts-rernove-unproven-potentially-harrnful-treatrnent-used-stern-cell-centers-targeting
vulnerable [https://perma.cc/CGH2-QPEL] (discussing the seizure of a vaccine "reserved only for people at high
risk of smallpox" from the Sternlrnrnune stern cell clinic).
142. See Diane C. Lade, Florida a Destination for Desperate Patients Buying Unproven Stem Cell
Treatinents, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Dec. 2, 2017), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/health/fl-fea-florida-stern-cell
clinics-20171130-story.htrnl [https://perrna.cc/3NRK-VGC4] ("Of 570 for-profit stern cell clinics counted in the
United States last year, 113 were found in California and 104 in Florida, far outpacing other states, according to
a report in the peer-reviewed journal, Cell Stern Cell."); see also Todd Ackerman, Critics Wary of Stem Cell
Clinics That Promise Big Results but Have Little Regulation, Hous. CHRON. (Nov. 26, 2017),
http://www.houstonchronicle.corn/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Critics-wary-of-stern -cell-clinics-thatpromise-12384995.php [https://perma.cc/YV9B-67P4] (offering criticisms of stern cell treatments available in
Texas and an overview of the motivation for Texas's statute increasing access to stern cell treatments in the
state).
143. See supra note 17 for more on the debate over the FDA's jurisdiction over innovations in the life
sciences (and the author's views in this debate).
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of the current federally focused regime. Part II.B explores noncooperative alternatives
such as allocating additional power to the FDA, redesigning the FDA, or devolving all
jurisdiction over innovative therapies (including jurisdiction over currently federally
regulated products such as drugs and biologics) to states. Part II.C then explains why
these noncooperative alternatives would not adequately improve the regulation of
innovative therapies.
A. Weaknesses of the Current Regime

The current federally focused regime for the regulation of innovative therapies
suffers from a number of shortcomings. The traditional literature on the FDA's
regulatory scheme emphasizes the "command and control" model of regulation in which
the FDA and regulated entities engage in a "strictly" exclusive relationship; 144 however,
states play an important role in the regulation of medicine. First, federal regulation does
not prohibit the marketing approval of all products that could operate counter to the
agency's goals of furthering the public health and safety, as evidenced by ( 1) the many
unexpected side effects of approved products; (2) products that are recalled voluntarily
after other entities, including physicians, discover significant adverse effects of those
products; and (3) the lack of comparative effectiveness research used in the United
States. 145 Second, the FDA has been vulnerable to risk-averse decisionmaking and
capture by anti-innovation special interest groups, which sometimes overlap with those
who are opposed to certain innovations based on political and social considerations,
without adequate transparency or public deliberation. 146
Beyond the ad hoc nature of regulating through guidance documents, a significant
problem will continue to arise: a significant amount of recent medical innovation
involves political and social issues, which the FDA, a regulatory agency within the
executive branch, is not only unequipped to objectively assess but also should not assess
based on its lack of transparency when regulating based on political or social views. 147
144. See Paradise. 21st Century Citizen Pharma. supra note 34. at 312.
145. See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 33, at 2364, 2368-71, 2373, 2380; see also Mary J. Davis, The
Battle over Implied Preemption: Product Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1151 (2007) (showing
that labeling regulations combined with the FDA's policy of negotiating with manufacturers over labeling
changes resulted in a years-long delay in implementing that change, which even extended past the date the dmg
was voluntarily recalled); Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 11, at 429-31 (discussing "a spate of incidents where
serious risks came to light after drugs were approved"); Vioxx Risk Lingers At Least I Year After Using Drug,
NBC
NEWS
(Oct.
13,
2008),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27l6944l/#.USBLMGfg4S4
[https://perrna.cc/GHN6-38LW].
146. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology,
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 842 (1999) ("Economic and legal theorists prominent in the public choice
movement have long lamented the undue susceptibility of the political process to small, politically active interest
groups."); see also William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest
for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1539-40, 1548 (2009) [Buzbee,
Preemption Hard Look Review]; Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory Preemption
of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 611, 627 (2010) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Who Decides]
("Outside of the notice-and-comment mlernaking paradigm, transparency of agency standard setting declines,
potentially precipitously.").
147. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. For more on the inappropriateness of considering
political concerns in medical regulatory decisiornnaking, especially as it relates to the reproductive sphere, which
would be implicated by gene editing, see, for example, Myrisha S. Lewis, The American Democratic Deficit in
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Yet, the specter of decisionmaking based on politics as opposed to science looms. To the
extent that those political reasons are disguised as scientific concerns or ethical views,
"political reasons prompting an agency to decide based on factors irrelevant under the
authorizing statute are clearly out-of-bounds." 148
Past regulatory actions reveal that the agency sometimes includes outside
considerations in its regulatory process. Examples of these outside considerations
influencing the regulatory process include the FDA's decisionmaking in the approval
and conversion of emergency contraception, notably "Plan B," from a prescription to an
over-the-counter drug, and recently, concerns about the role of patient involvement in
FDA decisionmaking, especially when the agency is tasked with regulating for safety
and effectiveness. 149 Current and forthcoming technologies implicate political and social
issues, namely ones related to genetic modification, that the FDA is not structured to
regulate due to its status as an executive branch agency (as opposed to an independent
regulatory agency) and how it has routinely prohibited public discussion of the ethical
(or social or political) issues that may arise in the regulation of various innovative
technologies (even though those same political issues may have surfaced in the agency's
decisions related to the FDA's effective banning of human cloning and forms of assisted
reproductive technology involving genetic modification). 15° Furthermore, the FDA
should not regulate these issues. Historically, fuese issues have involved concerns related
to reproductive rights, which an agency that is subject to political pressure should not
subject itself to. 15 1

Assisted Reproductive Technology Innovation. 45 AM. J.L. & MED. 130 (2019) [hereinafter Lewis. The
American Democratic Deficit].
148. Mendelson. Disclosing "Political" Oversight. supra note 19. at 1141 (discussing this exception as

the sole exception to the general rule that "courts have not offered clear guidance on whether political reasons.
if offered. can serve as an adequate basis for an agency's decision").
149. See Heinzerling. supra note 20. at 928 (discussing how the delay in the approval of Plan B as an
over-the-counter drug was not based on safety or efficacy but rather political motivations); Lewis. How
Subterranean. supra note 17. at 1273-75 (discussing how political or social considerations can impact federal
regulatory decisions in the realm of assisted reproductive technology); see also Lars Noah. AMiscarriage in the
Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics. 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571.
573-74 (2001) ("This Article concludes that the FDA's decisionrnaking process [related to mifepristone (RU486). a drug that is used to induce abortion.] was and probably will continue to be distorted by an inappropriate
preoccupation with achieving a politically predetermined outcome."); Susan Pulliam and Brody Mullins. How
the FDA Approved a $300, 000-a-Year Drug Its Own Experts Didn'tBelieve Worked, WALL STREET J. (May 18,
2017, 10:43 AM), http://www.wsj.corn/articles/how-the-fda-approved-a-300-000-a-year-drug-its-own-experts
didnt-believe-worked-1495116544 [https://perrna.cc/WNS2-4A2E]; Sabrina Tavemise, FD.A. Approves
Muscular Dystrophy Drug That Patients Lobbied For, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.corn/2016/09/20/business/fda-approves-muscular-dystrophy-drug-that-patients-lobbied
for.htrnl [https://perma.cc/KMB9-9HRP].
150. For background on independent regulatory agencies as compared to executive branch agencies, see,
for example, Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 599, 600 (2010). For more on the impact of social and political concerns on agency decisionrnaking, see,
for example, Lewis, How Subterranean, supra note 17, at 1271-79; Lewis, The American Democratic Deficit,
supra note 147, at 167-68.
151. See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 85, at 354 ("Given the . . . [d]eep-seated religious opposition to
assisted reproduction, substantive regulation is likely to shut down promising innovations rather than provide a
safer way to test their impact."); see also Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight, supra note 19, at 1143.
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B. Noncooperative Alternatives

To illustrate the limitations of a noncooperative framework, this Part provides an
overview of singularly state-based and federally based options and assesses their
usefulness in regulating innovative therapies against the above-mentioned criteria. Part
II.B.l examines options for statutory changes to the FDA's method of regulating
innovative medical techniques and preemption doctrine. Part II.B.2 discusses the option
of state-by-state regulation of the life sciences (similar to how states address the results
of assisted reproductive technology or have enacted laws banning human reproductive
cloning).
1.

Congressional Action To Allocate Jurisdiction or Redesign the FDA

Congress could undertake various efforts to improve the regulation of innovative
therapies. One solution to the challenge of regulating the life sciences is one in which
Congress crafts a new category and definition of product that the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) regulates. Based on the current distribution of
jurisdiction within the HHS, the FDA would likely be the agency that would federally
regulate these innovative therapies. 152 As noted in Part II.A, "the FDA's system of
regulation is category driven"; however, some products do not fall solely within one
specific category of FDA-regulated product. 153 With this legislative solution, Congress
would introduce another category of a FDA-regulated product, thus filling the gap
between drugs and biologics-two categories that innovative therapies in the life
sciences tend to fall in between.
Such an approach would be similar to Congress's action after the FDA lost to the
tobacco industry, subsequent to the FDA asserting jurisdiction over cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco as '"combination products' that deliver nicotine to the body." 154 In
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 155 the Supreme Court held that tobacco
products did not fall within the jurisdiction of the FDA; 156 subsequently, Congress passed
152. See Food & Drug Administration. U.S. DEP'T HEALTI-! & HUM. SERVS..
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-po !icy/regulations/fda/index.html [https://perma.cc/79 GM-6V 4NJ
(last updated Mar. 18. 2016) ("The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is an HHS agency that regulates
clinical investigations of products under its jurisdiction. such as drugs. biological products. and medical
devices.").
153. See Javitt & Hudson, supra note 17. at 1213.
154. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp .. 529 U.S. 120. 125-26 (2000). superseded by statute.
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. Pub. L. No. 111-31. § 101. 123 Stat. 1776. 1783 (2009)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387 (2018)).
155. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
156. Brown & Williamson. 529 U.S. at 125-26 ("Regardless of how serious the problem an administrative
agency seeks to address. however. it may not exercise its authority 'in a manner that is inconsistent with the
administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.' . . . In this case. we believe that Congress has clearly
precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. Such authority is inconsistent with
the intent that Congress has expressed in the FDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific
legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA. In light of this clear intent. the FDA's assertion of
jurisdiction is impermissible."); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL.. STATUTES. REGULATION. AND
INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 210 (2014); Foote &
Berlin. supra note 36. at 643; Richard A. Merrill. The FDAMay Not Regulate Tobacco Products as "Drugs" or
as "Medical Devices." 47 DUKE L.J. 1071. 1074-94 (1998).
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legislation that statutorily empowered the FDA to regulate tobacco products. 157 The
advantage of such an approach is that the federal govermnent could create a statutory
definition that encompasses all innovative therapies, although such a statutory creation
could reduce state jurisdiction. A clearer definition of federal authority, which would
also involve broadening the FDA's authority, could resolve jurisdictional concerns,
although it likely would have to be revised again. At the same time, such a definition
might be difficult to create and potentially short-lived as innovative therapies move
towards being more personalized to various patients and thus are not amenable to
large-scale manufacturing (and broad categorizations). 158 In addition to these prospective
disadvantages, expanding federal jurisdiction would possibly lead to greater preemption
of state authority in the traditionally state-regulated field of medical practice. 159
A second federally based solution could focus on preemption. Preemption is a
doctrine whose foundation lies in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 160 The
Supremacy Clause establishes that in case of conflict between state and federal law,
federal law applies. 16 1
A discussion of preemption doctrine inevitably arises in the context of regulation
of the life sciences because, to the extent that the FDA has jurisdiction over the life
sciences, its regulations and statutes will generally preempt conflicting state law. 162 Yet,
preemption doctrine also operates based on a presumption against preemption. 163 Even
though "[f]ederal and state regulatory powers overlap enormously when it comes to
157. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 101; see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note
156, at 210.
158. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the jurisdictional challenges
brought on by the popularity of individualized treatments.
159. See supra Section I for a discussion of the dual jurisdictional nature of innovative therapies. See
also infra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
160. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 617-18 (2011) ("The Supremacy Clause establishes that
federal law 'shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.' Where state and federal law 'directly conflict,' state law must give way." (omission
in original) (citations omitted)); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: MoreMuddle,
or Creeping To Clarify?, 45 TuLSAL. REV. 197, 198-99 (2009) ("By its terms, the Supremacy Clause says very
little about state law and certainly does not explicitly authorize Congress to displace state law . . . . Instead,
current preemption doctrine . . . presumes that the Supremacy Clause is the source of all preemption.").
161. PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 617-18; Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
712-14 (1985). Federal regulations are equated with federal statutes in Supremacy Clause analysis by virtue of
the federal statute empowering the agency to make those regulations. See Bhagwat, supra note 160, at 201 ("The
conventional wisdom, as stated by the Supreme Court, is that '[flederal regulations have no less pre-emptive
effect than federal statutes." (alteration in original) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982))).
162. See Noah, State Affronts, supra note 27, at 28-35 (discussing preemption in the context of
pharmaceutical licensing and the ability of plaintiffs to recover under state tort law for harms suffered due to the
use of FDA-approved pharmaceuticals); Sharkey, States Versus FDA, supra note 78, at 1611; see also
McCuskey,Body of Preemption, supra note 77, at 96, 110 ("And, where the state attempts to regulate in an area
where federal regulation already exists, 'the federal scheme prevails though it is a more modest, less pervasive
regulatory plan than that of the State."' (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947))).
163. See McCuskey, Body of Preemption, supra note 77, at 95, 98 ("Unlike the general presumption
against preemption on federalism grounds, courts base this tradition presumption on a notion of 'state primacy'
that is rooted in tradition and unique to health regulation. Therefore, courts assume it is unlikely in most cases
that Congress intended to preempt state health laws.").
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regulating health," there are areas in which the powers do not overlap at all, 164 which the
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine acknowledged in a report
commissioned by a number of federal agencies, including the FDA. 165 In those areas in
which jurisdiction does not overlap and federal law does not provide jurisdiction over an
aspect of innovative therapy, the jurisdictional default is for those "reserved powers" to
go to the states. 166 Preemption doctrine would expand federal jurisdiction at the expense
of state jurisdiction, which, as outlined in the next Part, would deprive American patients
of the current benefits of state regulation. These benefits include complementing federal
regulation by aiding in the discovery of adverse effects of FDA-approved products and
ensuring Americans have proper access to the regulatory structures that have been
created due to the state's historic police powers.
A preemption-based solution could also use a waiver to allow states to opt back into
the regulatory system after the expansion of federal jurisdiction, where interested states
obtain the approval of the FDA to regulate innovative therapies. To have a waiver-based
system, however, the federal goveflllllent would still, as a foundational matter, have to
preempt or supersede the authority of the states. 167 A natural inclination, especially in
light of the use of waivers in other areas of health regulation, namely health insurance
regulation, might be to create a statutory waiver for jurisdictional issues related to
scientific innovation; 168 however, this Article does not recommend that approach for
several reasons, as outlined in Part II. C. 169
Another congressional action could focus on the deficiencies in the FDA's
jurisdiction or method of exercising jurisdiction by transforming the nature of the agency.
Other scholars have explored transforming the FDA, or part of it, into an independent
regulatory agency. 170 While transforming the FDA into an independent regulatory

164. Elizabeth Y. McCuskey. Agency Imprimatur & Health Reform Preemption. 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1099.
1101 (2017) [hereinafter McCuskey. Agency Imprimatur].
165. NAT'L ACADS. OF Sers.. ENG'G. & MED.. PREPARING FOR FUTURE PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
1. 10-11 (2017). http://www.nap.edu/24605 [https://perma.cc/58M7-C237].
166. See Lawrence 0. Gostin. TheModel State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health and Civil
Liberties in a Time of Terrorism. 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3. 24 (2003) ("However. states have 'plenary' authority
to protect the public's health under their reseJVed powers in the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has
made clear that states have a deep reseJVoir of public health powers. conceiving of state police powers as an
'immense mass of legislation [in which] [i]nspection laws. quarantine laws. [and] health laws of every
description . . . are component[s] of this mass.' The Supreme Court. moreover. has regarded Federal police
powers as constitutionally limited. and has curtailed the expansion of national public health authority." (omission
in original) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution. nor prohibited by it to the states. are reseJVed to the states
respectively. or to the people.").
167. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 23, at 866 ("Congress can also 'hire' the states to carry out federal
programs through the use of conditional preemption. Under this system, Congress enacts a general regulatory
scheme, delegating implementation to the states on the condition that the states submit an acceptable
implementation plan to the federal goverrnnent.").
168. See, e.g., McCuskey,Agency Imprimatur, supra note 164, at 1102-03 (introducing the Section 1332
waiver program that "applies to the ACA's core [insurance] provisions").
169. See infra Part II.C.
170. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text for more on the jurisdictional limits of the federal
government over innovative therapies. Scholars have proposed other options, including an independent
regulatory agency for a number of innovative technologies; however, to the extent that these innovative therapies

4 16

TEMPLE LAW REVIE W

[Vol. 92

agency could reduce the executive branch's influence on access to innovation and might
increase the scientific quality of decisionmaking, changing the nature of the FDA,
however, still would not solve the underlying problem of how to recognize and address
federal and state jurisdiction.
2.

State-by-State Regulation of the Life Sciences

While this Article does not advocate for a state-by-state approach, an analysis of a
state-by-state approach is useful insofar as some states might opt into a cooperative
system and others might not. Broadly, state regulation of innovative therapies could
result in both a "race to the bottom" and a "race to the top." A race-to-the-bottom
approach could involve some states adopting a regulatory structure that permits any sort
of therapy, which may result in patient harm, whereas a race-to-the-top approach could
lead to a restrictive regime that is similar to the FDA's current regulation of
pharmaceuticals in one specific state. Such a restrictive regime could cause innovators
to have to comply with multiple state-based regulatory regimes.
To the extent that innovative medical techniques constitute the practice of medicine
and are not "articles" subject to the regulation of the FDA, a state-by-state approach to
regulating the life sciences would operate similarly to how states address the results of
assisted reproductive technology or have enacted laws banning human reproductive
cloning. 17 1 Similarly, in the current regime, the federal goveflllllent serves as a
"gatekeeper" to the pharmaceutical market, and state regulation provides a regime that
patients can use when physicians improperly administer those federally approved
products. 172 Thus, federal assertions of jurisdiction aim to prevent certain types of harms
(or, at the very least, to inform the public of potential harms), but state-regulated entities,
namely physicians, work to determine which "safe and effective" treatments are best to
use. It is also possible that states would not want to involve themselves in the regulation
of innovative medical techniques in a robust manner or in a manner different from how
a state regulates other instances of medical malpractice or access to markets. For
example, in spite of state statutes governing the treatment of the results of assisted
reproductive technology, namely the parentage of children conceived using assisted
reproductive technology, scholars and commentators continue to regard traditional
assisted reproductive technology as "unregulated" or "minimally regulated" by the states
and the federal goveflllllent. 173

would iJNolve both state and federal jurisdiction, an independent regulatory agency could improve federal
jurisdiction as a matter of scientific assessment but that still does not resolve the issue of shared jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, The CRJSPR-Cas9 Tool of Gene Editing: Cheaper, Faster, Riskier?, 26 ANNALS
HEALTI-! L. 33, 49-51 (2018); see also Robert M. Califf et al., Seven Former FDA Commissioners: The FDA
Should Be an Independent Federal Agency, 38 HEALTI-! AFFAIRS 84, 84 (2019).
171. See Lewis, How Subterranean, supra note 17, at 1251-53.
172. See supra Section I.
173. See Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Assessing theMarket for Human Reproductive Tissue Alienability: Why
Can We Sell Our Eggs but Not Our Livers?, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 643, 655, 689 (2008) ("Additionally,
states have also neglected to enter into the regulation of the reproductive marketplace."); see also Lewis, How
Subterranean, supra note 17, at 1241 & n.l (providing citations to the conventional view that assisted
reproductive technology is unregulated or "minimally regulated"). But see State Laws Related to Insurance
Coverage for Infertility Treatiuents, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (June 12, 2019),
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C. Insufficiency ofNoncooperative Alternatives

Both singularly federal and singularly state-based approaches suffer from
significant weaknesses. Drawing on the experience of states in the regulation of assisted
reproductive technology, it remains possible that some states will want to continue not
being involved in the regulation of certain current and forthcoming innovations. 174 Even
if all states choose not to participate, such a regulatory regime would be no different than
the current state of federally based regulation but would at least recognize state
jurisdiction. 175 A state-by-state approach would be inconsistent as different states would
likely choose different regulatory approaches, whereas the current method of federal
regulation indicates that the federal regulatory system is predictably hostile to certain
innovations in medicine. 176 In a state-by-state regime, a variety of regulatory systems
would likely emerge. 177 This variety of regulatory systems might include certain systems
that increase the rate of patient access to developed innovative therapies or that
encourage the development of innovative therapies, which would ultimately lead to
patients being able to access innovative therapies more quickly. A purely state-based
system, moreover, would require states to replace the current regulatory role of the FDA
so as to still maintain a baseline level of patient safety.
At the same time, this Article does not advocate for any increase in the scope of
federal power. First, the preemption doctrine fails to resolve the difficulty of regulating
innovative therapies as innovative therapies straddle traditional areas of federal and state
jurisdiction. 178 Further, by using preemption instead of a shared regulatory approach, the
regulatory system is deprived of a meaningful dialogue between states and the federal
goveflllllent on emerging innovations and regulatory changes. Creating a cooperative
regime that facilitates debate and discussion among the states and the federal goveflllllent
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-laws.aspx
[https:/ /perma.cc/6VJPSSBW] (identifying states with statutes addressing insurance coverage of assisted reproductive technology).
174. See Lewis. How Subterranean. supra note 17. at 1251-53 (reviewing state legislation related to the
regulation of assisted reproductive technology and noting that "[s]tate law generally does not restrict the
mechanics of assisted reproductive technology"); see also Lewis. The American Democratic Deficit. supra note
147. at 149 ("Historically. there has been little state or federal regulation of ART. which allowed the industry to
develop with little regulatory oversight.").
175. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of federal regulation over products used in the practice of
medicine.
176. The federal government both regulates innovation through federal agencies (e.g.. the FDA) and
funds research in medicine and other areas (e.g.. grants provided by the NIH). As such. there is sometimes a
difference between the approaches taken by federal regulatory agencies and participants in the federal regulatory
stmcture and the research initiatives undertaken by or funded by the federal government. Compare Lewis. How
Subterranean. supra note 17. at 1274 (discussing the federal hostility to innovation in assisted reproductive
technology involving genetic modification). with Budget. NAT'L INSTS. HEALTI-I. http://www.nih.gov/about
nih/what-we-do/budget [https://perma.cc/A2CL-TAQ3] (last updated Jan. 24. 2019) ("The NIH invests nearly
$39.2 billion annually in medical research for the American people." (footnote omitted)).
177. See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 85, at 359 ("If, on the other hand, the issue arises in the context of
state legislation, the legislature may be indifferent, if not downright hostile, to the concerns of a lesbian couple.");
see also Reddix-Smalls, supra note 173, at 655 ("Thus, the lack of initial federal funding for embryonic and
genetic research created a vacuum of federally sponsored research that was filled by private entrepreneurs,
private research facilities, and medical universities in the fertility industry.").
178. See McCuskey, Body of Preemption, supra note 77, at 96 ("Preemption generally describes the
displacement of state law by federal law.").
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promotes a number of federalism's values, with an emphasis on participation and
transparency. 179
This Article also does not recommend a preemption-based solution that would
combine preemption with a waiver. First, a waiver would likely involve the FDA
deciding whether to grant a waiver to states that apply, which would not be preferable in
light of the agency's previous regulation without jurisdiction. 180 Second, a waiver would
imply that the federal govermnent was approving the exercise of state jurisdiction only
in certain instances, which would not fully recognize concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction, especially in the absence of additional federal grants. 18 1 Third, to the extent
that a waiver was created that did preserve judicial review of agency action, a judge
might assume that the FDA had the requisite (and superior) "[s]cientific and technical
expertise" in the area of regulation, thus leading to increased judicial deference to the
agency's decision. 182 In sum, a waiver would likely empower the FDA to continue
imposing additional regulatory requirements on U.S. entities and also on states that
would participate in the regulation of innovative therapies in a waiver-based system. 183
Based on this analysis, this Article's cooperative framework further discourages
both explicit and implicit federal preemption of state jurisdiction. Specifically, this
Article is most concerned by implied preemption, for which states (and patients) may not
have notice. 184 In the absence of an explicit preemption provision, similar to the one that
Congress provided with the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA, the FDA
may unexpectedly act to preempt state authority, in spite of the promises and
acknowledgments of members of Congress and past FDA employees about the lack of
FDA jurisdiction over the practice of medicine. 185 This Article also does not advocate
179. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243,
249 (2005) ("[I]t is the dynamic interaction among states and the national government that forms the true sound
of federalism."); see also Metzger, Federalism, supra note 111, at 24-25.
180. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 301
(2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2018)) (discussing the Secretary of Health and Human Services's ability to
grant waivers to states that apply); see also Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in
Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1441 (1984) ("Granting exemptions or waivers for more protective
state provisions thus requires the agency to acknowledge the limitations of its own decisionrnaking.").
181. While not discussed in this Article, another form of cooperative federalism in health law, Section
1332 waivers, also tends to focus on insurance programs. See, e.g., Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Big Waiver Under
Statutory Sabotage, 45 Omo N.U. L. REV. 213, 214-18 (2019).
182. McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 164, at 1156; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside
Agency Preemption, l l0 MICH. L.REv. 521, 551 (2012) [hereinafterSharkey, Inside Agency Preemption] ("FDA
claims that its interpretations of its regulations governing drug labeling are entitled to deference.").
183. See, e.g., Barron & Rakoff, supra note 180, at 325 ("The more power the agency has to establish the
substantive criteria that will trigger its willingness to waive, the more authority it has to impose a new set of
regulatory requirements in the course of 'waiving' those on the books.").
184. Express preemption is authorized by an explicit statutory provision, whereas implied preemption is
not. See Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 182, at 525 n.11. For more on the complexities of
preemption, including explicit, implicit, and implied preemption and the limits of the "presumption against
preemption," see generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2013); Caleb
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000).
185. For more on the regulation of medical devices and the evolution of that regime, see Merrill, The
Architecture, supra note 23, at 1800-35. For more on the operation of preemption doctrine within the context of
the Medical Devices Amendments, see generally Lars Noah, Amplification of Federal Preemption inMedical
Device Cases, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183 (1994).
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for the addition of an explicit preemption provision for innovative therapies, as doing so,
even with a procedure for requesting an exemption, would minimize experimentation
and a dialogue between states and the federal govermnent on the regulation of innovative
therapies. Such a procedure would also subjugate state jurisdiction to federal jurisdiction
and minimize the significance of additional actors in the regulatory process. The next
Section aims to incorporate the most advantageous aspects of the noncooperative
alternatives explored in this Section and the cooperative programs discussed later in Part
III.B, while at the same time aiming to minimize the disadvantages of all of those options.
III. A COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING lNNOVATlVE THERAPIES
There are a number of options that could improve the regulation of innovative
therapies. The current federally focused system is not the best way to regulate life
sciences innovations, and a singularly state-based regime would also suffer from
significant limitations. As previously noted, the current, federally focused regulatory
system has failed to adequately regulate a number of innovative therapies and is not
adequately structured to accommodate those innovative therapies including gene editing,
gene therapy, and regenerative medicine therapies with a focus on autologous stem cell
treatments.186 The current system suffers from at least three shortcomings: ( 1) failure to
recognize the existence of state jurisdiction; (2) regulatory gaps in which innovative
therapies do not fit wholly within the FDA-regulated categories, even with the
combination products statute; and (3) the possibility that the executive branch is making
decisions based on political views involving certain social or ethical controversies
without disclosing those views to the public or soliciting public input.
A shared, hybrid system of jurisdiction could also be useful for life sciences
innovations involving umesolved controversies, innovative therapies that are classified
as "riskier" than current techniques in use in medical treatment, or biologics and drugs
that are currently approved by the FDA.187 A cooperative system would offer more
flexibility than the current federally focused regime. A cooperative regulatory scheme
would also improve patient health, especially since states already have some jurisdiction
over the life sciences through the practice of medicine.188 There are a number of criteria
that would trigger this Article's framework for regulating innovative therapies, including
the existence of an innovative therapy (generally these innovative therapies are
desigriated as "combination products" by the FDA),189 the existence of state jurisdiction
(as is the case with innovative therapies which are hybrids of state and federal
jurisdiction), 190 and FDA governance and assertion of jurisdiction via guidance
documents. 19 1 Additionally, while this is not the case for all of the innovative therapies
186. See supra Parts I.A and I.C.
187. See supra note 145 for examples of FDA-approved products that have been withdrawn from the
market after adverse side effects come to light.
188. See supra Part LB for an analysis of state jurisdiction over the practice of medicine.
189. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text and Part LC for a discussion on innovative therapies
and their amenability to a cooperative governance structure.
190. For more on federalism in the regulation of food and drugs. see. for example. Sharkey. States Versus
FDA. supra note 78. at 1610-15.
191. Continued assertions of jurisdiction via guidance documents connect not only to concerns that the
FDA may be regulating outside of its jurisdiction but also to the transparency of regulation. See, e.g., Seidenfeld,
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studied in this Article, the possibility that the therapy will be accompanied by ethical
controversy greater than that of traditionally FDA-regulated products weighs in favor of
the application of this Article's cooperative framework, as it would increase the number
of regulatory actions and reduce the possibility that the ethical controversy might
manifest as ethically or socially motivated regulatory decisiomnaking by the FDA.
This Article's proposed cooperative framework aims to minimize the likelihood
that, due to overregulation in the United States, people leave the country to either receive
safe and effective therapies in places like Germany or receive risky therapies in countries
(and even some states) that underregulate. While recent legislative efforts, including
notably the 21st Century Cures Act, have improved the pace of regulation, especially, as
this Article indicates, in the area of regenerative medicine with the increased funding to
the FDA and to federally funded researchers, an additional challenge that the agency
faces is the increasing complexity of the products that it must regulate. 192 Part III.A
provides background on the concept of cooperative federalism. Part III.B focuses on four
areas in which cooperative programs are used to balance state and federal interests. Part
III.C describes the goals, advantages, and disadvantages of a cooperative system for
regulating innovative therapies. Part III.D provides specific structures that encompass
the goals of the cooperative system for regulating innovative therapies.
A. Cooperative Federalism

This Article draws upon cooperative federalism programs in constructing its
cooperative framework for the regulation of innovative therapies. Cooperative
federalism originated in 1938 as commentators noted a shift in goveflllllental behavior
in "classical" federal countries, such as the United States and Canada, after the Great
Depression. 193 The first use of cooperative federalism in American legal literature was
also in 1938, as part of an Iowa Law Review symposium on the subject. 194 The term
"cooperative federalism" eventually appeared in a reported federal decision in 1950 and
has since appeared in numerous Supreme Court and other federal court decisions. 195
Historically, cooperative federalism has been characterized as "largely an invention of
the Progressives, who attempted to reconcile their nationalist ambitions with their
affection for local goveflllllent." 196

Who Decides. supra note 146. at 627 ("Outside of the notice-and-connnent mlernaking paradigm. transparency
of agency standard setting declines. potentially precipitously.").
192. See Kapczynski. supra note 33. at 2382.
193. See Ronald L. Watts. Origins of Cooperative and Competitive Federalism. in TERRITORY.
DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE 201. 204---05 (Scott L. Greer ed.. 2006).
194. Id. at 204; see also Symposium on Cooperative Federalism. 23 IOWA L. REV. 455. 456 (1938)
("Comparatively recently. however. there has developed an entirely new field of experiment characterized by
the participation of several governments in cooperative legislative or administrative action. The interaction may
be between the National Government and one or more of the states or among the states themselves. This realm
of 'Cooperative Federalism' it is the purpose of this Symposium to explore.").
195. Robert L. Glicksman. From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of
Environmental Law and Policy. 41 WAKE FORESTL. REV. 719. 725 (2006).
196. Greve. supra note 26. at 576. For more on the historical evolution of cooperative federalism. see id.
at 576-84.
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Since its inception, cooperative federalism has led to a "voluminous" literature that
focuses on cooperation between federal, state, and local govermnents. 197 While
cooperative federalism does not have an exact definition, it is generally viewed as a form
of regulation involving the "sharing of regulatory authority between the federal
govermnent and the states that allows states to regulate within a framework delineated
by federal law." 198 Thus, cooperative federalism programs often arise in areas where
jurisdiction is concurrent or shared, and much of the literature focuses on shared
jurisdiction between state or local and federal govermnents. 199 Often, cooperative
federalism involves the use of federal funding, especially "conditional grants" as an
inducement for state regulatory action. 200 States can choose whether to participate in
cooperative federalism programs. 20 1
Cooperative federalism offers the benefit of combining federal oversight of issues
of national importance with local tailoring of programs by state and local govermnental
officials. 202 Through cooperative federalism programs, states can shape national
policies. 203 Within a cooperative federalism framework, states are able to experiment
with various regulatory regimes subject to a federal minimum.204 States and the federal
govermnent also interact more often in cooperative frameworks.205 Further, federal
agencies with cooperative federalism programs tend to be more receptive to federalism
concerns. 206 This Article focuses on the sharing aspect of that regulatory approach in
constructing a shared framework for the regulation of innovative therapies.
Cooperative federalism has a number of advantages and disadvantages, similar to
other forms of governance. Cooperative federalism is often contrasted with dual
federalism, which envisions "separate and distinct spheres of [state and federal]
authority"; however, scholars have noted that such a clean separation between the

197. Hills. supra note 23. at 815. For more on cooperative federalism. broadly. and on cooperative
federalism in healthcare and the Affordable Care Act. specifically. see Abbe R. Gluck. Intrastatutory Federalism
and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond. 121 YALE
L.J. 534. 537-40. 548-52 (2011).
198. Weiser. supra note 22. at 665; id. at 668 ("Although there is no precise definition for which regimes
fit the cooperative federalism model. the Supreme Court has suggested that this term best describes those
instances in which a federal statute provides for state regulation or implementation to achieve federally
proscribed policy goals."). For more on the origins of the term "cooperative federalism." see Glicksrnan. supra
note 195. at 719. 728-29.
199. See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 195, at 719-20.
200. Hills, supra note 23, at 858--61.
201. See Weiser, supra note 22, at 704-05.
202. David Schleicher, Vermont Is a Constitutional Problem, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 253, 278 (2019).
203. Id.
204. See William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism,
21 WM. & MARYENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 12, 25 (1997).
205. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 31 (2011) (discussing negotiations
between state and federal governments related to enforcement in areas of overlapping jurisdiction).
206. Id. at 18 ("Professor Catherine Sharkey . . . also observes that agencies engaged in programs of
cooperative federalism with state partners better heed federalism concerns than those administering programs
without state collaboration. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which works closely
with states in administering the Clean Air and Water Acts, has shown much greater deference to state interests
than the Federal Dmg Administration, whose regulations have preempted state common law without much
sensitivity." (footnotes omitted) (citing Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 19, at 2155-72)).
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spheres is difficult.207 In light of the blurring of the line of authority in the regulation of
the hybrid innovative therapies, cooperative federalism is a useful regime to examine in
the context of innovative therapies, which are hybrids of state and federal jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, cooperative federalism has incited many criticisms and concerns.
One concern with the existence of cooperative federalism programs is that it may prove
difficult to ensure accountability due to the difficulty in ascertaining which political
level-state or federal-is responsible for a decision.208 In a similar vein, opponents of
cooperative federalism argue that it also leads to a "loss of transparency." 209 Others have
noted that cooperative federalism can minimize the effectiveness of state elections and
reduce accountability as voters will not know who to credit (or blame) for the outcomes
of cooperative federalism programs.2 10 Another criticism is that cooperative federalism
"reliably produces . . . a big, sprawling government." 21 1 Some scholars view cooperative
federalism as a system of governance that reduces state autonomy as states often act as
"faithful agents implementing federal programs" as opposed to strongly autonomous
sovereigns.2 12 This concern is particularly prevalent in regimes where the federal
government has provided funds to states. Other commentators have noted that an
alternative to cooperative federalism could be simply to have federal governmental
agencies with branch offices that implement federal law, similar to the regional offices
of the Environmental Protection Agency or Offices of the U.S. Attorneys.2 13 Part III.C
explains why, in spite of these concerns, this Article still advocates for a cooperative
approach.
B. Examples of Cooperative Federalism

Systems for state and federal cooperation often use waivers, exemptions, and opt-in
programs in order to balance state and federal interests and improve regulation.214 Many
of these cooperative programs fall under the guise of cooperative federalism, especially
those programs that involve the expenditure of federal funds, which are used in
state-administered programs.2 15 Cooperative federalism is used to regulate in a number
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
(2009).
213.
214.

Weiser. supra note 22. at 665. 693.
Hills. supra note 23. at 826-27; see also Weiser. supra note 22. at 696-97.
Greve. supra note 26. at 567. 575.
Schleicher. supra note 202. at 281.
Greve. supra note 26. at 592.
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken. Uncooperative Federalism. 118 YALE L.J. 1256. 1262

Schleicher. supra note 202. at 278-79.
See Metzger. The Constitutional Duty. supra note 22. at 1853; Vehicle Emissions California Waivers
and Authorizations. EPA. http://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california

waivers-and-authorizations [https://perrna.cc/J22J-6LQS] (last updated June 23. 2017). For example. section 209
of the Clean Air Act "allows California to seek a waiver of the preemption which prohibits states from enacting
emission standards for new motor vehicles." Id. Section 209 of the Clean Air Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7543
(2018). For discussions of waivers in other areas. see Derek W. Black. Federalizing Education by Waiver?. 68
VAND. L. REV. 607. 611 (2015) (waiver of failure to comply with No Child Left Behind); Jessica Bulrnan-Pozen.
Executive Federalism Comes to America. 102 VA. L. REV. 953. 1003---09 (2016) [hereinafter Bulrnan-Pozen.
Executive Federalism] (waivers to jumpstart Medicaid expansion). See generally Barron & Rakoff. supra note
180. at 265 (exploring agencies' ability to waive Congress's mies).
215. See Greve. supra note 26. at 566; Weiser. supra note 22. at 665.
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of areas in the law including environmental, education, and welfare. 216 This Part provides
an overview of some cooperative federalism programs that relate to healthcare, which
this Article then draws upon in constructing a structural framework for the regulation of
innovative therapies. While the examples in this Part are not perfect parallels to the
regulation of innovative therapies, each cooperative regime provides a relevant lesson or
insight that could improve the regulation of innovative therapies.
1.

Medicaid

Medicaid is an example of a cooperative framework that uses waivers and federal
funding. 2 17 Medicaid, which was enacted in 1965, provides payment for the healthcare
needs of "eligible low-income adults, children, pregnant women, elderly adults and
people with disabilities."2 18 Medicaid is a joint state-federal program in which "[f]ederal
law outlines broad mandatory requirements that state Medicaid programs must follow,
but states retain considerable flexibility to cover additional eligibility groups and
benefits." 219 Within Medicaid, the federal government provides grants to states, which
in tum must comply with federal statutory and regulatory requirements. 220 In spite of
those federal requirements, states retain flexibility in a number of areas, including
"provider qualification, participation and compensation."22 1 Individual states administer
and also provide funding to their own Medicaid programs.222
The Medicaid program also permits state flexibility through section 1 1 15
waivers. 223 Section 1 1 15 waivers permit states to submit applications for "experimental,
pilot, or demonstration project[s]" that would likely further specified goals outlined in
the Medicaid statute. 224 A recent study found that as of January 16, 2020, forty-two states
had fifty-three approved section 1 1 15 waivers, and twenty-two states had twenty-six
pending waivers. 225 Medicaid waivers cover a number of policy innovations including
216. Weiser. supra note 22. at 668-70; see also Glicksman. supra note 195. at 719-20. 723-25; Greve.
supra note 26. at 558.
217. See Bulrnan-Pozen. Executive Federalism. supra note 214. at 1003-09; Weiser. supra note 22. at

668.

218. See Medicaid. MEDICAID.GOV. http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/index.htrnl [https://perma.cc/
VXN9-YR6S] (last visited Feb. 1. 2020); Program History. MEDICAID.GOV. http://www.medicaid.gov/about
us/program-histoiy/index.htrnl [https://perrna.cc/8TLQ-83Y7] (last visited Feb. 1. 2020).
219. Sidney D. Watson. Out of the BlackBox and into the Light: Using Section 1115Medicaid Waivers
To Implement the Affordable Care Act'sMedicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L., & ETHICS 213, 214
(2015); see also, e.g., Prescription Drugs, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/prescription
dmgs/index.htrnl [https://perrna.cc/5KQP-3778] (last visited Feb. 1, 2020) ("Medicaid is a joint Federal-State
program that pays for medical assistance for individuals and families with low incomes and relatively few
assets.").
220. See Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau.Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7. 17 (200 l);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2018) (listing the requirements for state Medicaid plans).
221. Rosenbaum & Rousseau. supra note 220, at 22; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a;Medicaid, supra note 218.
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315.
224. Id.; see also About Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/
medicaid/section-1115-demo/about-l l15/index.htrnl [https://perrna.cc/M24U-T4QJ] (last visited Feb. 1, 2020).
225. Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Jan. 16, 2020). http://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-approved-and
pending-section-l 115-waivers-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/EY8Q-MRFS].
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expanded healthcare coverage and "advances in coverage, access, health outcomes,
efficiencies in delivery of care, or other improvements to the health of beneficiaries
(while maintaining budget neutrality)."226
Waivers have also surfaced in the context of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Recently, for example,
[s]ome states expanded Medicaid eligibility precisely as the ACA's text laid
out; others chose not to expand at all; still others negotiated (and renegotiated)
waivers to tailor Medicaid to their liking . . . . All of these states experienced
autonomy; all of their choices generated policy localism and experimentation.
Waiver states arguably cooperated with the federal govermnent and dissented
simultaneously. 227
Medicaid "is fixed in the collective consciousness as a classic example of cooperative
federalism" due to its combination of federal funding and requirements, state
administration, and the furtherance of state options through statutory waiver
provisions.228 Even though Medicaid addresses policy innovation as opposed to scientific
innovation, Medicaid is a joint state-federal program that provides a cooperative
structure that could be applied to the regulation of scientific innovation.229
The advantage of using cooperative federalism in the Medicaid program instead of,
for instance, having no state role is that states are "closer" to the population that Medicaid
would serve. 230 As such, states will have valuable insights that the federal govermnent
would not. Additionally, states have already created a structure to provide services to
those who Medicaid would serve and to administer the program, such as through the
emolling of participants, thus sparing the federal govermnent from exerting the effort of
creating an insurance program for those who would be entitled to Medicaid services.23 1
Massachusetts, for example, used a Medicaid waiver to provide health insurance
coverage to all residents, which ultimately influenced the federal health insurance
structure that the ACA provided.232
At the same time, Medicaid is a program that has been the subject of numerous
criticisms over the years.233 Further, there is a risk fuat, through a program such as
Medicaid, where the federal govermnent sets a floor, the federal govermnent will try to

226. Nicole Huberfeld. Work Requirements + Medicaid � BadMedicine. B.U. SCH. PUB. HEAL TI-! (Jan.
23. 2018). http://www.bu.edu/sph/2018/0 1/2 3/work-requirements-medicaid-bad-medicine/ [https://perrna.cc/
9BY6-XHAW]. But see Emily Whelan Parento & Nicole Huberfeld. Trump, Bevin Violate Federal Law with
New Medicaid Rules, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Jan. 24, 2018, 4:00 PM), http://www.kentucky.com/
opinion/op-ed/articlel96436639.htrnl [https://perrna.cc/36S5-BMUB] (discussing the negative impacts of a
Section 1115 waiver granted in Kentucky).
227. Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Health Care For?, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1689, 1694-95 (2018).
228. See Nicole Huberfeld, FederalizingMedicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 434 (2011). But see id.
(observing that "the program's design is creating more discord than cooperation").
229. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 219, at 214.
230. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Bounds of Congress's Spending Power, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. I, 24 (2019)
[hereinafter Seidenfeld, The Bounds].
231. Id. at 24-25.
232. Ryan, supra note 205, at 64.
233. See, e.g., John V. Jacobi,Medicaid Evolution for the 21st Century, 102 KY. L.J. 357, 357-58, 36469 (2013) (analyzing the criticism that "Medicaid is 'broken"').
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force states to undertake certain actions, even when it exceeds the parameters of federal
power. In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal govermnent could not require
states to expand their Medicaid programs after the federal govermnent threatened to
remove all Medicaid funding from states that refused to expand Medicaid. 234 Thus,
cooperative federalism programs can create situations in which the federal govermnent
has additional opportunities to exceed its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, similar to how
section 1 1 15 waivers permit "experimental, pilot, or demonstration project[s ]" that
would likely further specified goals outlined in the Medicaid statute, a cooperative
program for regulating the life sciences could facilitate experimental projects likely to
assist in promoting the objectives of both the FDCA and state statutes related to the
practice of medicine, namely public health and safety.235
2.

Communicable Disease Prevention

Both the states and the federal govermnent share responsibility for preventing the
spread of communicable diseases.236 The most liberty-restricting of those shared
responsibilities include isolation, which separates infected individuals from the rest of
the population, and quarantine, which restricts the movements of those who may have
been exposed to an infectious disease.237 State jurisdiction over the spread of disease
stems from states' historic police powers arising from the Tenth Amendment.238 All
states have statutes related to quarantine or isolation.239 Local govermnents have also
instituted isolation measures.240
States originally instituted quarantine practice exclusively, but Congress eventually
enacted federal legislation governing quarantine.24 1 Today, the PHSA provides federal
quarantine jurisdiction.242 As a constitutional matter, the federal power over quarantine
stems from the Commerce Clause.243 Currently, the federal govermnent's authority to
quarantine individuals lies with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

234. Nat'! Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius. 567 U.S. 519. 580-87 (2012).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018); About Section 1115 Demonstrations. supra note 224.
236. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 264(a). 290bb-2 l(a); Polly J. Price. Do State Lines Make Public Health
Emergencies Worse? Federal Versus State Control of Quarantine. 67 EMORY L.J. 491. 498 (2018) ("All U.S.
states provide for isolation or quarantine by statute.").
237. See Price. supra note 236. at 496-98.
238. See, e.g., JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33201, FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE
AND ISOLATION AUTHORITY 6 (2014) (discussing the "primary authority for quarantine and isolation exists at
the state level as an exercise of the state's police power[s,]" derived from the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution).
239. See Price, supra note 236, at 498.
240. See, e.g., id. at 509 (discussing the City of Milford, Connecticut, imposing a ban on a student from
elementary school for twenty-one days after a family trip to Nigeria during the 2014 Ebola outbreak although
there were no cases of Ebola in Nigeria).
241. See History of Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/historyquarantine.htrnl [https://perrna.cc/3BL4-6X7J] (last updated Jan. 10,
2012).
242. See Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html [https://perma.cc/MX3 4-L43 4]
(last updated Oct. 8, 2014).
243. Id.
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(CDC). 244 The CDC operates quarantine stations at various points of entry into the United
States, including airports, land border crossings, and ports. 245 The last time the federal
govermnent instituted large-scale quarantine and isolation measures was in 1918 during
an influenza outbreak. 246
State and federal cooperation is already an important aspect of the public health
laws that prevent the transmission of communicable diseases. The PHSA already
requires the Secretary of HHS to
encourage cooperative activities between the States with respect to
comprehensive and continuing planning as to their current and future health
needs, the establishment and maintenance of adequate public health services,
and otherwise carrying out public health activities. The Secretary is also
authorized to train personnel for State and local health work. 247
Moreover, the HHS, which includes a number of federal agencies, including the CDC,
FDA, and NIH, is authorized to accept assistance from state and local authorities "in the
enforcement of quarantine regulations made pursuant to [United States Code Title 42,
Chapter 6A] ."248 Similarly,
[t]he Secretary [of HHS] shall also assist States and their political subdivisions
in the prevention and suppression of communicable diseases and with respect
to other public health matters, shall cooperate with and aid State and local
authorities in the enforcement of their quarantine and other health regulations,
and shall advise the several States on matters relating to the preservation and
improvement of the public health. 249
Beyond the spirit of cooperation in communicable disease prevention, the statute also
directs the HHS to cooperate with "[s]tate and local authorities . . . in the enforcement
of . . . other health regulations and . . . matters relating to the preservation and
improvement of the public health."250 Moreover, states (and the federal govermnent)
regulate blood products, for example, to prevent the spread of disease, an action that has
withstood a preemption challenge in the Supreme Court. 25 1
Commentators have criticized state govermnents as being "especially prone" to a
politically driven response to an epidemic that might manifest as an "overly restrictive
and counterproductive use of quarantine." 252 Recently, the CDC cooperated with state

244. Price. supra note 236. at 514 (citing COLE. supra note 238. at 2).
245. See U.S. Quarantine Stations. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION.
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/quarantine-stations-us.htrnl [https://perrna.ccN7P 5-Y472] (last updated Sept.
29. 2017).
246. See Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine. supra note 242.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 243(b) (2018); see also Price. supra note 236. at 512-14 (arguing that the federal
government's power over preventing the spread of infectious disease is greater than simply cooperating at a
state's request); id. at 518-19 (analyzing a preemption clause that was added to the PHSA in 2002).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 243(a); see also HHS Agencies & Offices, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/hhs-agencies-and-offices/index.htrnl [https://perrna.cc/JT7G-FN3A] (last
updated Oct. 27, 2015).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 243(a).
250. See id.
251. See Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1985).
252. See Price, supra note 236, at 500.
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governments that instituted quarantine measures during the 20 14 Ebola outbreak.253
Others characterized this as a deference to state governments as the CDC's position was
that these quarantine measures were unnecessary.254
State police powers also manifest in state statutes related to vaccinations.255 The
FDA approves vaccines on the basis of safety even though vaccines, like other
FDA-approved products, are "neither perfectly safe nor perfectly effective." 256 All states
impose vaccine requirements on children who will be attending public school.257 The
federal government also provides grants to states that support their childhood vaccination
programs.258 Thus, the federal government approves the tools that are the subjects of
state statutes and programs related to public health goals. State and federal cooperation
on communicable disease prevention offers a model in which state and federal
governments routinely interact in the realm of public health. Ultimately, a cooperative
framework for regulating innovative therapies would comport with previously created
statutory requirements calling for state and federal cooperation in furtherance of the
public health.
3.

Food Regulation

The FDA already cooperates with states in the area of food regulation and should
apply the cooperative spirit used in food regulation to the regulation of innovative
therapies. For example, the National Shellfish Sanitation Program is a "federal/state
cooperative program recognized by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference for the sanitary control of shellfish

253. See id. at 505; Kyle Edwards et al., Why the C.D.C. 's Power To Quarantine Should Worry Us, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/opinion/why-the-cdcs-power-to-quarantine
should-worry-us.htrnl [https://perrna.cc/RJT8-4YTG]; Marc Santora, First Patient Quarantined Under Strict
New Policy Tests Negative for Ebola, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/10/2 5/nyregion/new -york-ebola-case-craig-spencer.html [https://perrna.cc/LAA5-XB2H].
254. See Price, supra note 236, at 524.
255. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-26,
39 (1905); id. at 34 (discussing Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1904), a case involving a state statute
related to vaccinations in New York).
256. Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, VaccinationMandates: The Public Health Imperative and
Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTI-I PRACTICE 338, 339-41 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2007);
Vaccines, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/vaccines [https://perrna.cc/LME8-59CF] (last
updated July 5, 2019); see also 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(C) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C)(i)(l ) (2018) (noting
that approval of biological products is based on whether the product is "safe, pure, and potent").
257. See WEN S. SHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10300, AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL
AUTI-!ORITY To IMPOSE VACCINATION REQUIREMENTS 2 (2019); James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin,
School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 833 (2002); id.
at 869-73 (illustrating the different vaccinations required by statute within each state); Dorit Rubinstein Reiss
& Lois A. Weithom, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the
Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 892 (2015).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(a); Malone & Hinman, supra note 256, at 343. For more on federal funding of
public health initiatives, see, for example, Polly J. Price, Sovereignty, Citizenship, and Public Health in the
United States, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 919, 950-55 (2014); Prevention and Public Health Fund, U.S
DEP'T HEALTI-! & HUM. Servs., http://www.hhs.gov/open/prevention/index.htrnl [https://perma.cc/7BMX-3Z6J]
(last updated Dec. 16, 2016).
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produced and sold for human consumption."259 The National Shellfish Sanitation
Program also "include[s] program guidelines, State growing area classification and
dealer certification programs, and FDA evaluation of State program elements."260
Similarly, the FDA maintains a cooperative program in order to aid state agencies
with the regulation of retail food providers as over "3,000 state, local and tribal agencies
have primary responsibility to regulate the retail food and foodservice industries in the
United States." 26 1 In this program, similar to other federal cooperative programs, the
FDA offers model regulations, guidance, "training, program evaluation, and technical
assistance." 262 Cooperation in food regulation is another instance of a cooperative
program in which the federal govermnent offers its expertise and assistance to state
govermnents in the regulation of a matter of both local and national importance.
4.

Nuclear Medicine

States already regulate one of the tools used in the practice of medicine,
radioisotopes, through a program in which federal authority is relinquished to the
states.263 While this is not a cooperative program of shared (or concurrent) jurisdiction
in the way that other programs related to public health are, many aspects of the program
are applicable to the structuring of a state-federal program that would regulate innovative
therapies.
Jurisdictional aggrandizement is not the goal of every federal agency, and some
agencies aim to include states within the regulatory system. 264 The U.S. Nuclear
259. National Shelljish Sanitation Program
(NSSP) .
FDA. http://www.fda.gov/food/
guidanceregulation/federalstatefoodprograms/ucrn2006754.htm [https://perma.cc/FUW9-WY6D] (last updated
Oct. 17. 2018) ("Participants in the NSSP include agencies from shellfish producing and non-producing States.
FDA. EPA. [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]. and the shellfish industry. Under international
agreements with FDA. foreign governments also participate in the NSSP.").
260. Id.
261. Retail
Food
Protection.
FDA.
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/
Retai!FoodProtection/default.htm [https://perma.cc/N8EW-ASKU] (last updated May 20. 2019).
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., Agreement State Program, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION, http://www.nrc.gov/about
nrc/state-tribal/agreement-states.htrnl [https://perma.cc/U2U5-W2Q5] (last updated Dec. 14, 2018) ("NRC
provides assistance to States expressing interest in establishing programs to assume NRC regulatory authority
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Section 274 of the Act provides a statutory basis under which
NRC relinquishes to the States portions of its regulatory authority to license and regulate byproduct materials
(radioisotopes); source materials (uranium and thorium); and certain quantities of special nuclear materials.").
264. See id. For more on federal agency efforts, including those of the FDA, to aggrandize their
jurisdiction, see, for example, Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 371 (1986) ("Courts sometimes fear that certain agencies suffer from 'tunnel vision' and as a result
might seek to expand their power beyond the authority that Congress gave them." (citing Hi-Craft Clothing Co.
v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 916 (3d Cir. 1981))); Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting, supra note 140, at 911-12;
Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts:MisplacedMetaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1463, 1487 (2000) ("Concerns about agency tendencies toward expansion have long existed. . . . [T]he
insights of public choice theory suggest that agency officials may act to further their self-interest, whether by
aggrandizing their own powers or placating powerful interest groups."); Noah, Little Agency That Could, supra
note 55, at 902-17. See generally Hi-Craft Clothing, 660 F.2d at 916 ("The more intense scrutiny that is
appropriate when the agency interprets its own authority may be grounded in the unspoken premise that
government agencies have a tendency to swell, not shrink, and are likely to have an expansive view of their
mission. Not surprisingly, therefore, an agency ruling that broadens its own jurisdiction is examined carefully.").
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Regulatory Commission (NRC) relinquishes regulatory authority over certain types of
nuclear material to individual states through its Agreement State Program so that those
states can regulate civilian uses of nuclear material that have lower proliferation concerns
such as the use of isotopes in medical treatment. 265 The goals provided in section 274 of
the Atomic Energy Act could be a useful model for changing the system for regulating
innovative therapies.266 The goals of the Agreement State Program include recognizing
that states have an interest in civilian uses of nuclear energy even though the federal
government mostly regulates the industry, recognizing the necessity of creating
cooperative programs between the states and the federal government, "promot[ing] an
orderly regulatory pattern," and effectively coordinating state and federal regulatory
efforts.267 While the regulation of nuclear materials differs from the regulation and
distribution of jurisdiction over innovative medical techniques, the NRC's Agreement
State Program represents an example of how the federal government can cooperatively
govern with individual states as it relates to issues that impact the practice of medicine.268
Further, the NRC created its Agreement State Program in response to state concerns
regarding their role in the regulation of radioactive materials in light of the establishment
of the NRC. 269
The NRC's Agreement State Program, created pursuant to section 274b of the
Atomic Energy Act, allows states with "adequate and compatible" regulatory programs
to regulate "source, byproduct and small quantities of special nuclear material." 270
Legally, the NRC relinquishes or discontinues its "authority over [the] source, byproduct
and small quantities of special nuclear material" in an Agreement State and then that

265. See, e.g., Agreement State Program, supra note 263.
266. See Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, sec. 1, § 274, 73 Stat. 688 (1959) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (2018)).
267. Id.; see also Agreement State Program, supra note 263.
268. See Agreement States Program, supra note 263; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012-14 (providing an
overview of federal regulation of the civilian use of nuclear power).
269. See Statement of Principles and Policy for the Agreement State Program; Policy Statement on
Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 46,517, 46,519 (Sept. 3, 1997),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-l 997-09-03/pdf/97-23330.pdf [https://perma.cc/P93C-7QGR] ("The Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 did not specify a role for the States in regulating the use of nuclear materials. Many States
were concerned as to what their responsibilities in this area might be and expressed interest in seeing that the
boundaries of Federal and State authority were clearly defined. This need for clarification was particularly
important in view of the fact that although the Federal government retained sole responsibility for protecting
public health and safety from the radiation hazards of byproduct, source, and special nuclear material, the
responsibility for protecting the public from the radiation hazards of other sources such as x-ray machines and
radium had been borne for many years by the States. Consequently, in 1959 Congress enacted Section 274 of
the Atomic Energy Act to establish a statutory framework under which States could assume certain regulatory
jurisdiction over byproduct, source, and special nuclear material in quantities less than a critical mass.").
270. Frequently Asked Questions on the Agreement State Program and the Wyoming Agreement State
Application, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/state-tribal/agreement
states/wyoming-faq.html [https://perrna.cc/8TRC-2LXN] (last updated Aug. 31, 2017); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 202 l (b), (d). For more on the NRC's evaluation of an Agreement State Program's adequacy and compatibility,
see Agreement State Program Policy Statement, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,840, 46,841-43 (Oct. 6, 2017),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-10-06/pdf/2017-21542.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AXR-QDH8]. See
generally Statement of Principles and Policy for the Agreement State Program; Policy Statement on Adequacy
and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. at 46,518-25.
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state regulates those categories of radioactive materials. 271 Currently, thirty-seven states
participate in the Agreement State Program and those states regulate eighty-six percent
of the nation's licenses for "source, byproduct and small quantities of special nuclear
material."272 The NRC periodically reviews those state programs, including "legislation,
regulations or other legally binding provisions," for adequacy and compatibility with
federal regulations. 273 Agreement States fund their own programs although the NRC does
offer training. 274
The materials used in nuclear medicine, which is "the use of radioactive materials
in diagnostic or therapeutic procedures, most notably treatments for various forms of
cancer," are eligible for the Agreement State Program. 275 The FDA is already
peripherally involved within the NRC's jurisdictional scheme for the regulation of the
medical use of nuclear materials as the
NRC (or the responsible Agreement State) also regulates the manufacture and
distribution of these products. The [FDA] oversees the good practices in the
manufacturing of radiopharmaceuticals,
medical
devices, and
radiation-producing x-ray machines and accelerators. The states regulate the
practices of medicine and pharmacy and administer programs associated with
radiation-producing x-ray machines and accelerators. 276
As such, regulatory authority in the area of nuclear medicine is already shared among
federal, state, and local authorities in a necessarily cooperative framework. 277
Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act specifically provides for federal cooperation
with state govermnents in the regulation of certain types of nuclear material.278 Congress
added this state-federal regulatory framework to the Atomic Energy Act in response to
state concerns "as to what their responsibilities in th[e] area [of "regulating the use of
271. See Frequently Asked Questions on the Agreement State Program and the Wyoming Agreement State
Application, supra note 270.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Statement of Principles and Policy for the Agreement State Program; Policy Statement on

Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. at 46,521 ("Currently, Section 274
does not allow federal funding for the administration of Agreement State radiation control programs. Section
274 permits the NRC to offer training and other assistance to a State in anticipation of entering into an Agreement
with NRC, however, it is NRC policy not to fund the establishment of new Agreement State programs.").
275. Frequently Asked Questions on the Agreement State Program and the Wyoming Agreement State
Application, supra note 270; NuclearMedicine: What It Is and Isn't, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION (Oct.
2, 2017), http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/protects-you/nuclear-medicine.htrnl [https://perrna.cc/
WY7M-BKK.9].
276. Medical
Uses
of
Nuclear Materials,
U.S.
NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION,
http://www.nrc.gov/materials/miau/med-use.htrnl [https://perma.ccNAT7-MX23] (last updated July 7, 2017)
(citation omitted) ("Regulatory authority over the medical use of ionizing radiation is shared among several
Federal, state, and local government agencies. NRC (or the responsible Agreement State) has regulatory
authority over the possession and use of byproduct, source, or special nuclear material in medicine. Byproduct
material is used in some calibration sources, radioactive drugs, bone mineral analyzers, portable fluoroscopic
imaging devices, brachytherapy sources and devices, ganrrna stereotactical surgery devices, and teletherapy units
used in medicine. Source material is used for radiation shielding and counterweights in medical devices. A few
cardiac pacemakers are still powered by special nuclear material batteries.").
277. Id.

278. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, sec. I, § 274, 73 Stat. 688 (1959) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (2018)).
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nuclear materials"] might be and [their] expressed interest in seeing that the boundaries
of Federal and State authority were clearly defined."279
In sum, the example of federal and state cooperation in the regulation of nuclear
material offers at least three lessons. First, it was created in response to state concerns
about their role in the regulation of an important matter of both local and national
concern. 280 Second, the system in which the NRC relinquishes jurisdiction stands in stark
contrast to FDA efforts to aggrandize its jurisdiction. 28 1 Third, as illustrated by the
thirty-eight states that participate in the NRC Agreement State Program, states may opt
to participate in a state-federal regulatory program once they have the opportunity. 282
The current NRC Agreement States include a number of innovators in medicine,
including stem cell research: New York, California, Texas, Maryland, and Florida. 283
Other states might follow the lead of these innovative states and implement their same
programs. 284 The NRC Agreement State Program is a state-federal cooperative program
that provides a counterargument to the anticipated criticism that states do not have the
expertise to regulate complex scientific processes. Further, the NRC Agreement State
Program reveals that even if federal jurisdiction is unquestionable, there are benefits in
sharing jurisdiction with states for certain regulatory functions.

***
The same nuclear regulatory goals of "promot[ing] an orderly regulatory pattern"
and effectively coordinating state and federal regulatory efforts also exist with the
regulation of innovative life sciences programs. 285 These goals are important not only to
life sciences development but also to the orderly transition of safe and effective
innovative therapies from the laboratory to clinical use.286 Recently, healthcare policy
has been categorized as "ha[ving] been shaped principally by cooperation and

279. Statement of Principles and Policy for the Agreement State Program; Policy Statement on Adequacy
and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs. 62 Fed. Reg. at 46.519; id. at 46.523 (discussing the purpose
of section 274 in the "federal-State regulatory framework" for radioactive materials).
280. See 42 U.S.C. § 202 l (a); supra note 269 and accompanying text.
281. Compare Statement of Principles and Policy for the Agreement State Program. 62 Fed. Reg. at
46.519. with Noah. Administrative Arm-Twisting. supra note 138. at 878-82 (discussing an example of the FDA
imposing "apparently unauthorized conditions on applicants").
282. See Agreement State Program. supra note 263 (noting that the Agreement State Program "provides
assistance to States expressing interest in establishing programs" (emphasis added)). Kentucky was the first state
to join the Agreement States Program in 1962. and today. there are thirty-eight Agreement States. Id. Currently.
Vermont is pursuing an application to become an Agreement State. Id.
283. See NRC: NMSS State Regulations and Legislation. U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION.
http://scp.nrc.gov/mlemaking.htrnl [https://perma.cc/749L-U9ZD] (last updated Oct. 1. 2019).
284. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 650 (2017)
("There are a number of mechanisms through which policy diffusion takes place. Competitive pressures, such
as 'races to the bottom' or 'races to the top,' can prompt states to adopt policies that are similar to each other,
and policy adoption in one jurisdiction may lead to copycat behavior in other jurisdictions seeking to minimize
any competitive disadvantage. Asymmetries in size or influence may allow 'strong' jurisdictions to foist their
policy preferences on 'weak' jurisdictions, for example by setting a product standard in a large market that all
manufacturers must meet." (footnote omitted)).
285. 42 U.S.C. § 202 l(a); see also Livermore, supra note 284, at 651-52.
286. See Livermore, supra note 284, 651-52.
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contestation between the federal executive branch and different groups of states."287 A
cooperative program for the regulation of innovative therapies would be another
state-federal cooperative program that would improve the ability of the agency to
efficiently regulate complex scientific processes whose use in medical practice is
expanding in scope. As emphasized by the passage and implementation of the ACA and
Medicaid, state-federal cooperation, or cooperative federalism, is an integral part of the
current healthcare regulatory system.288 Similarly, it is an integral part of much of public
health law, as in many areas, that state and federal jurisdiction overlap.289 Often such
"cooperative" characterizations in the context of healthcare focus on the Medicaid
expansion (or nonexpansion, depending on one's state).290 Health exchanges have also
been characterized as "involv[ing] an unanticipated merging of state and federal
authority."291
The cooperative programs analyzed in this Part provide various options for
regulating innovative therapies. The remainder of this Article incorporates the best
practices from these cooperative programs into this Article's proposed cooperative
framework for tile regulation of innovative therapies.
C. Goals of the Cooperative Framework

Legal structures can impact access to innovation and the costs of accessing those
innovations once they are on the market.292 The cooperative framework aims to increase
the pace of innovation, improve access to innovation, minimize regulatory hurdles to
innovation, increase transparency within the regulatory system, and provide a diversity
of inputs into regulatory decisionnmking.
One might ask, "Why not just expand the jurisdiction of the FDA instead of
emphasizing the role of the states?" There are at least four reasons to preserve state
jurisdiction over the practice of medicine, especially as it relates to innovative therapies.
First, states already have the legal infrastructure for regulating the practice of medicine.
Second, states serve as an important complement to federal regulation. As noted in
Section I, the Supreme Court observed that the FDA lacks the resources to monitor the
thousands of products that it approves for marketing in the United States.293 In this
climate "lawyers and their clients often find themselves serving as drug safety
researchers of last resort" as they discover harms of products after FDA approval. 294
287. Bulrnan-Pozen, Preemption, supra note 22, at 2036; see also Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 227,
at 1733-34.
288. See Bulrnan-Pozen, Preemption, supra note 22, at 2035-37; see also Federalism, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining "cooperative federalism" as the "[d]istribution of power between the
federal government and the states whereby each recognizes the powers of the other while jointly engaging in
certain governmental functions"); Metzger, The Constitutional Duty, supra note 22, at 1852-53.
289. McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 164, at 1109.
290. See, e.g., Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 227, at 1694-95.
291. Bulrnan-Pozen, Executive Federalism, supra note 214, at 978. For more on healthcare exchanges,
see also Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 227, at 1701---02, 1797-98.
292. See, e.g., Merrill, The Architecture, supra note 23, at 1755.
293. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
294. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 297 JAMA 308,
311 (2007); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578-79 (2009).
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These harms often manifest through state tort lawsuits, which thus serve a valuable role
in healthcare. 295 Third, in light of the states' benefit of being "closer" to patients than the
federal govermnent, strengthening the state-monitoring role would serve to further
patient health. 296 Fourth, to the extent that political or social views manifest in the federal
regulatory process, increasing the role of states in that process could create a diversity of
views. 297
In a cooperative system for regulating innovative therapies, states with experience
regulating and encouraging innovation in the life sciences, such as California,
Massachusetts, and Mary land, would be encouraged to have a larger stake in the
regulation of the life sciences. 298 As such, these states might be incentivized to participate
in such a system as encouraging innovation in the life sciences would align with the
states' current priorities. 299 Further, many of these states' support for innovation in the
life sciences became apparent when those states funded research, including stem cell
research, that the federal government would not fund. 300 Texas and Florida might opt
into such a system as the increased availability of experimental stem cell treatments in
those states and the issuance of state legislation addressing stem cell treatments
demonstrates. 301 Some states may decide to opt into such a regime after examining the
295. Wyeth. 555 U.S. at 578-79 ("State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives
for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly. They also serve a distinct compensatory function that
may motivate injured persons to come forward with information."); Kesselheim & Avorn. supra note 294. at
310-11.
296. See Seidenfeld. TheBounds. supra note 230. at 24 ("[T]he federal government does not have detailed
knowledge of the specific populations it would have to serve. and unlike states. the federal government does not
have an extensive system in place to provide social services to the poor. and hence would have to invest in
creating such a system.").
297. See Bulman-Pozen. Preemption. supra note 22. at 2031.
298. See supra notes 86. 88. 133 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Investing in the State of
Innovation, MAss. LIFE Ser. CTR., http://www.masslifesciences.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/BYM7-5ZFF]
(last visited Feb. I, 2020). Additionally, California is one of "[a] few states" that already has agencies "that
complement the FDA through inspection, research, and regulation of drugs and devices within the state."
Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 19, at 2160.
299. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of states' interests in medical
innovation.
300. See supra notes 85, 88 and accompanying text. For more on state initiatives funding stem cell
research, see JuDITH A. JOHNSON & ERIN D. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33524, STEM CELL
RESEARCH: STATE INITIATIVES 2-8 (2006), http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/research/GW-State
Funding.pdf [https://perma.cc/83TK-E8VD]; State Initiatives for Stem Cell Research, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH,
http://stemcells.nih.gov/research/state-research.htm [https://perma.cc/EP2V-YX8M] (last visited Feb. I, 2020).
301. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 1003.002 (West 2019); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra
note 212, at 1277 (noting that California's goal as a "super-regulator" under the Clean Air Act is "to implement
a regulatory regime that will prod national change"); Kelly Servick, Texas Has Sanctioned Unapproved Stem
Cell
Therapies.
Will It
Change Anything?,
Ser. (June 15,
2017, 11:15 AM),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/20 I 7/06/texas-has-sanctioned-unapproved-stem -cell-therapies-will-itchange-anything [https://perma.cc/Y2HH-QJ36]; see also Ackerman, supra note 142 (offering similar criticisms
of stem cell treatments available in Texas and an overview of the motivation for Texas's statute increasing access
to stem cell treatments in the state); Lade, supra note 142 (criticizing the existence of for profit stem cell clinics
in Florida and noting the relative prevalence of stem cell clinics in California and Florida compared to the rest
of the United States). At the same time, it is possible that Texas and Florida might also be states that would be
opposed to certain medical innovations. See, e.g., Calbone, supra note 85, at 356 ("Florida, Illinois, and Texas
further restrict the [surrogacy] procedure to those who can demonstrate medical need.").
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experiences of other states within the regime, thus allowing for federalism's goals of
policy experimentation and diffusion.302 The results of this experimentation could be
relevant not only to other states but also to the federal govermnent, just as it was in the
lead up to the creation of the FDCA. 303
A cooperative system changes the system of federal regulation, although it does not
eliminate federal regulation altogether. Instead, the cooperative system of regulation
ensures or aims to ensure regulation within appropriate jurisdictional boundaries.304 As
noted in Section I, the regulation of innovation in the life sciences involves both state
and federal jurisdiction as, despite the operation of federal law in certain areas, life
sciences regulation and public health regulation have yet to become areas of exclusive
federal jurisdiction.305 By capitalizing on the existence of state jurisdiction, the
regulatory system can expand the resources available to regulate innovative therapies,
which would address a number of concerns related to the resource constraints that the
FDA faces.306 Additionally, states may not necessarily regulate in a manner that is
different from the federal government. For example, examining abortion regulation in
the United States, the existence of a federal baseline that states can then modify might
lead to a regulatory system that is normatively undesirable. Nevertheless, the addition of
states into the regulatory system offers, at the very least, a diversity of views.307 A
diversity of views could also lead to increased access to therapies within the United
States, as it would differ from the current federal risk-averse (and possibly politically
motivated) baseline, which would be significant especially for those who lack the means
to travel abroad or the means to thoroughly investigate therapies available in the United
States.
While this Article does not argue for waivers per se, this Article draws from certain
aspects of waiver-based programs such as Medicaid in constructing its structural
framework. Ideally, a cooperative governance structure could remove the political views
of the executive and legislative branches from the regulatory process so that federal
regulation focuses solely on safety and efficacy and not social views on the acceptability
302. See Livermore. supra note 284. at 650 ("[P]olicy adoption in one jurisdiction may lead to copycat
behavior in other jurisdictions seeking to minimize any competitive disadvantage.").
303. For more on state statutes related to food and dmg regulation before the creation of the 1906 Federal
Pure Food and Dmg Act. see Frank R. Strong. Cooperative Federalism. 23 I0WA L. REV. 459. 479-82 (1938).
304. See supra notes 154-156 for a discussion of FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.• 529 U.S.
120. 125-26 (2000). in which the Supreme Court assessed the limits of federal agency jurisdiction.
305. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1552 (2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation] ("Outright
preemption remains a choice embraced in an array of areas, especially where laws or regulations mandate
specific product features or engineering. So-called 'complete preemption' is also found in a few areas where
Congress has defined its role as exclusive, often in connection with special solicitude for a particular industry
such as nuclear power, or a broad social goal such as childhood vaccination." (footnote omitted)); id. at 1554
("Federal floors preclude less stringent state and local regulation, but allow for additional and more stringent
regulation and typically are accompanied by savings clauses and cooperative regulatory structures."); see also
Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 709-23 (1985) (rejecting arguments for the
federal preemption of local ordinances related to the collection of plasma).
306. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text regarding the resource constraints that the FDA faces.
307. See Nat'! Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012) ("Because the police power is
controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on citizens'
daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the governed.").
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of certain therapies. However, even if the cooperative governance structure this Article
recommends did not remove those political views, it could supplement the existing
federal political views and diversify the political views available to decisionmakers. A
regulatory scheme that incorporates state governments before the FDA decides whether
to approve a product would not only render the federal regulatory process more
transparent by introducing additional actors, but it would also introduce another check
on the FDA's executive power. 308 Because creating a structural framework that includes
the states would increase the number of actors who would actively participate in the
regulatory process, transparency and diversity within the decision-making process would
also increase.
For those innovative therapies that would involve ethically controversial products
or procedures, the cooperative system would likely require a more transparent discussion
of the difference between ethical opposition and the medical risks involved with the use
of those technologies, and likely, at the state level. 3 09 States, in tum, could continue using
their expertise in examining social and ethical considerations in regulation, instead of
having their assessment foreclosed, as occurs in a federally based process. 310 In doing
so, a cooperative process strikes a balance between federal experience with regulating
pharmaceuticals, states' jurisdiction over the practice of medicine, and states' historic
roles as "laboratories of experimentation." 311 A cooperative system of regulation could
also be useful for techniques or medical treatments that are not emerging or the subject
of burgeoning media or scientific interest, but still somewhat controversial, including the
increased use of medical (and recreational) marijuana in the United States and the
possible increase in products containing THC. 312 A cooperative solution also increases
the number of parties available to monitor innovative therapies, as prior events have
indicated that "[m] onitoring ' lies at the heart of the matter "' of the regulation of
innovative therapies, especially where the FDA lacks resources to monitor the products
that it already has exclusive jurisdiction over.313
308. As will be detailed later in this Section. the state-federal connnittee would be a public committee.
For more on how states can seive as checks to the federal executive branch. see Bulman-Pozen. Federalism as
a Safeguard. supra note 22. at 486-501.
309. A future article will focus on the use of risk assessments in the regulation of life sciences innovation
and pharmaceutical generation. That article will also explore how best to regulate life sciences innovations that
involve ethical controversies. especially those involving gerrnline modification of DNA.
310. See supra notes 147-151 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of social and political
concerns in FDA regulation.
311. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 212, at 1261.
312. See Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., Behind Schedule Reconciling Federal and StateMarijuana Policy,
379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501---02 (2018) (discussing state regulation of medical and recreational marijuana,
federal regulation of marijuana, and the possible tensions between federal criminal law, federal regulatory law,
and state decriminalization efforts); see also FDA Regulation of Cannabis and Cannabis-Derived Products,
Including Cannabidiol (CED), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/fda-regulation
cannabis-and-cannabis-derived-products-questions-and-answers [https://perrna.cc/9XRL-ASPQ] (last updated
Oct. 16, 2019) ("[D]elta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) . . . is considered the psychoactive component of
cannabis.").
313. Sibbald, supra note 110, at 1612; supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555, 578-79 (2009) ("The FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market, and
manufacturers have superior access to information about their drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as
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Many of the disadvantages of a solution that incorporates the states, such as
resource constraints and the possibility of capture, are similar to those that already exist
at the federal level.3 14 As such, concerns about regulatory capture, which could be an
issue for innovative therapies that pharmaceutical companies create, will not be
allayed.3 15 Just as regulatory capture is a concern in federal regulation, it is also a concern
in state regulation.3 16 Thus, state agencies will also be susceptible to regulatory capture.
At the same time, from the perspective of preventing capture, recognition of diverse
jurisdictional powers might serve as an obstacle to capture by diffusing the targets. Also,
states would be able to capture the federal government more easily. It has been suggested
that stakeholders in certain debates should "focus their lobbying efforts on agencies and
the mlemaking process, not (as is the current dominant strategy) exclusively on
Congress." 3 17 This suggestion stems from the perspective that "[f]ederal agencies now
play the dominant role in statutory interpretation." 3 18 A cooperative solution for
regulating innovative therapies would diffuse targets for those seeking to capture
decisionmakers in the regulatory process.
Another criticism that may arise is that there might be a race to the bottom in which
various companies race to states with the most favorable (and underregulating)
legislation in order to avoid regulatory requirements. There are at least two responses to
this concern. First, a race to the bottom would still be one in which FDA regulation at
the very least provided a "floor" of regulation as the regulation of medical products
continues to exist.3 19 As such, including states in the hybrid regime does not lead to
complete decentralization of the regulation of innovative therapies as federal law
persists.320 Second, a race to the bottom is not the only response to more state regulation.
For example, Delaware is well-known for its regulation of large, public corporations;
however, that regulation has led to a robust system of regulation that is well regarded by
corporate law scholars and most observers as opposed to little regulation or no regulation
new risks emerge. State tort suits uncover unknown dmg hazards and provide incentives for dmg manufacturers
to disclose safety risks promptly." (footnote omitted)); Buzbee. Asymmetrical Regulation. supra note 305. at
1616 ("Little 'learning by monitoring' will go on witb no diversity of institutional actors and no reward for such
action."); Sharkey. Federalism Accountability. supra note 19. at 2136 ("More specifically. several House
Representatives charged tbat tbe FDA 'suffers from a high turnover rate of scientists. an inadequate information
technology system. a weak organizational structure. and a rapidly declining inspection force."').
314. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) ("[U]s[ing] the word
'capture' as shortband for the phenomenon whereby regulated entities wield their superior organizational
capacities to secure favorable agency outcomes at the expense of the diffuse public.").
315. See, e.g., Jane R. Bambauer, Dr. Robot, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383, 398 (2017) ("There is also a
risk of anti-competitive maneuvering by the health tech firms themselves, at least the one that come to the table
first. IBM's Watson team already has a very close working relationship witb tbe FDA. The two are collaborating
on a Blockchain project."); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2008).
316. See Owen, supra note 24, at 204.
317. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 182, at 526.
318. Id. at 521.
319. See supra Section I for a discussion of tbe practice-products divide and tbe federal regulation of
medical products.
320. See Livermore, supra note 284, at 644 ("Managed experimentation in which the federal government
provides incentives for policy innovation while setting national baseline standards that mitigate public choice
failures at the local level is a better alternative to unfettered decentralization.").
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at all.3 21 Further, for those who do not view Delaware's regime as a race-to-the-top
system of regulation, federal law, as administered through the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, still provides a federal floor in the same way that federal law, as
administered through the FDA, does.322 In the realm of innovative therapies, states would
have an even stronger interest in patient health, due to the fact that, as state expenditures
on Medicaid indicate, states already pay money to treat citizens' health problems.
Further, states have an economic interest in life sciences innovation as evidenced through
initiatives such as research grants, including those through stem cell funds.323 Simply
because states cooperate in the regulation of a certain technique does not mean that they
have to create an entirely new regulatory structure. For example, Maryland has a statute
that requires the application of federal research protections to research conducted in its
state that would not otherwise fall under the jurisdiction of the federal goveflllllent. 324
Third, a race-to-the-bottom argument must consider that the race to use innovative new
technologies is not U.S.-centric; instead, not only are Americans willing to travel to other
states to obtain innovative treatments, but many are willing to travel abroad, often to
countries that are known to have little oversight over medical treatment.325 An
improvement in the U.S. regime of regulation could increase the pace with which
Americans can access safe, innovative medical treatments here in the United States.
D. Structures that Institute the Goals of the Cooperative Framework

Administrative law scholarship has noted the inadequacies of various executive
orders requiring agencies to consult with states throughout the regulatory process and to
consider the federalism impacts of their regulatory actions.326 Similarly,

321. See Mark J. Roe. Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 594 (2003); Roberta Romano,
The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON
REG. 209, 212-14 (2006). But see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,

83 YALE L.J. 663, 670 (1974) ("Judicial decisions in Delaware illustrate that the courts have undertaken to carry
out the 'public policy' of the state and create a 'favorable climate' for management. Consciously or
unconsciously, fiduciary standards and the standards of fairness generally have been relaxed. In general, the
judicial decisions can best be reconciled on the basis of a desire to foster incorporation in Delaware. It is not
clear, however, that the revenue thermometer should replace the chancellor's foot. This trend should be
reversed.").
322. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections
upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003).
323. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.31 (West 2019) (creating the Christopher Reeve Stern Cell
Research Fund). For more on state stern cell initiatives, see JOHNSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 300, at 2-8.
324. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTI-I-GEN. § 13-2002 (West 2019) ("Notwithstanding any provision in the
federal regulations on the protection of human subjects that limits the applicability of the federal regulations to
certain research, [federal research protections] appl[y] to all research using a human subject.").
325. See supra notes 9-11.
326. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999); Sharkey, Federalism
Accountability, supra note 19, at 2163--64 (discussing the federalism impact statements (FISs) required by
Executive Order 13,132 and agencies' responses, which have "either blithely ignored their responsibility to
provide FISs or have gone to great lengths to obfuscate whether their preemption determinations have any
federalism impact whatsoever"); id. at 2191-92 (noting that "agency disregard of state regulatory interests" has
raised questions regarding "the boundaries of federal law and the outcome of clashes with state law"); see also
Foote, supra note 180, at 1431-32 ("[C]onclu[ding] that agencies have failed to protect the states' interests in
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notice-and-comment rulemaking is insufficient for the expression, consideration, and
inclusion of state regulatory concerns into the regulatory process.327 Administrative law
scholarship often uses the FDA's behavior to illustrate the lack of consideration of
federalism values in agency decisionmaking.328 For example, even in spite of an
executive order requiring agencies to consider federalism values, the effect of that order
has been cursory statements in regulations.329 That executive order has only resulted in
the FDA making statements in the preamble to regulations such as, "Here, FDA has
determined that the exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal
authority under the act" 330 and "Because we have determined that the act preempts State
law because the exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority
under that statute, we need not construe our statutory rulemaking authority as required
by section 4(b) of the Executive order." 331 In light of the lack of substantial compliance
with previous requests to consider federalism values and the FDA's favoring of
preemption, informal methods of including states are insufficient to ensure adequate
consideration of state jurisdiction and a more permanent and structured method of
including states in the regulation of innovative therapies is necessary.332
As many Supreme Court decisions have emphasized, including the recent Medicaid
decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius ,333 there are
restraints on federal power and the ability of the federal government to commandeer state
jurisdiction and autonomy.334 The cooperative framework furthers state autonomy by
targeting federal power for restriction. In sum, the federal power to hinder innovation
and access to innovation should be severely limited in favor of state experimentation in
the absence of a very high showing of harm.
To the extent that the FDA's guidance documents and other regulatory decisions
that the FDA has undertaken involve a lack of transparency, a cooperative framework
should adopt many of the transparency-inducing aspects of cooperative federalism
health and safety as Congress intended that they do under the administrative preemption provisions."); Greve.
supra note 26. at 604 (criticizing federalism impact statements).
327. Sharkey. Federalism Accountability. supra note 19. at 2137. 2139-40.
328. See id. See infra note 332 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FDA's preference for
pro-preemption policies and their impact on the jurisdictional balance in regulating innovative therapies.
329. Sharkey. Federalism Accountability. supra note 19. at 2163-64. But see id. at 2164-68 (detailing
other instances of FDA outreach to states although these focused on the solicitation of comments for proposed
mies).
330. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products. 71 Fed. Reg. 3922. 3967 (Jan. 24. 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201. 314. 601 (2019)).
331. Id. at 3967 n.10.
332. See Buzbee. Preemption Hard LookReview. supra note 146. at 1527-28 (discussing the FDA's "pro
preemption" position in regulation); see also Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products. 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935 (asserting the FDA's view that "[s]tate law
actions also threaten FDA's statutorily prescribed role as the expert Federal agency responsible for evaluating
and regulating drugs").
333. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
334. See, e.g., Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 579-80; see also Strong, supra note 305, at 470 ("The Tenth
Amendment, however, expressly reaffirms what is implicit in the body of the original Constitution-there is a
limit to federal power, beyond which is the province of the states."). For more on the limits of federal jurisdiction,
see, for example, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902, 925-36 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 149, 161--63 (1992).
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programs, which include public hearings and consultations between various
stakeholders.335 Even though states are able to participate in the FDA's decisionmaking
through mechanisms such as advisory committee meetings and agency requests for
comments, a cooperative framework would acknowledge state jurisdiction and also
provide more access to the regulatory decision-making process by rendering
decisionmaking more of a joint effort.336 The hope is that a cooperative regime,
especially for those life sciences innovations that would involve ethically controversial
methods and/or products, would likely require a more transparent discussion of the
difference between ethical opposition and the medical risks involved with the use of
those technologies. Further, the cooperative framework would encourage states not just
to respond to innovative therapies through retroactive regulation such as through tort
regimes (including malpractice laws) as well as through the licensing of professionals
who administer those therapies, but also to develop more comprehensive regimes that
focus on innovative therapies. The remainder of this Article provides some specific
examples that exemplify this Article's cooperative framework.
1.

Innovative Therapies Committee

The FDA already has scientific advisory committees; however, the
recommendations of experts on these committees are not binding.337 Building on the
existence of these committees, this Article advocates for a type of committee that
recognizes state jurisdiction. Environmental law, which contains numerous cooperative
frameworks, provides a number of useful lessons for improving the regulation of
innovative therapies.338 In addition to decades of cooperative federalism, often through
waivers, there are other statutory provisions from environmental law that would prove
useful in acknowledging coexistent state-federal jurisdiction. While federal agencies
have generally failed to meaningfully consider the implications of their actions on states
and state jurisdiction, the Environmental Protection Agency has been recognized for its
incorporation of federalism concerns into its regulatory process.339 One way to further
considerations of federalism is to insert a check into the regulatory structure. A
committee similar to the Endangered Species Committee would be helpful.340 The
Endangered Species Committee, which was created by an amendment to the Endangered
335. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 23, 887-88.
336. Sharkey, States Versus FDA, supra note 78, at 1626, 1628 (providing information on state
opportunities to participate in the FDA drug approval process).
337. 21 U.S.C. § 355(n) (2018); see also Advisory Committees, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
AdvisoryCornmittees/default.htm [https://perma.cc/9AC5-NG5R] (last visited Feb. 1, 2020).
338. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 24, at 204; Hannah J. Wiseman, Delegation and Disjunction, 35 YALE
J. ON REG. 233, 236 (2018).
339. See, e.g., Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 19, at 2164 n.149 ("The EPA stands as a
counterexample. It has been at the forefront in terms of providing internal guidance on how to conduct a suitable
FIS consistent with the principles embodied in Executive Order 13,132."); see also Sharkey, Inside Agency
Preemption, supra note 182, at 569-70 ("EPA and the states have developed a collaborative relationship as
coregulators, particularly over the past twenty years. EPA has an internal Office of Congressional and
Intergovernmental Relations ('OCIR') that coordinates a variety of state-EPA performance partnerships, such
as the National Environmental Performance Partnership System ( 'NEPPS')."); supra notes 328-332 regarding
the FDA and federalism concerns.
340. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (2018).
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Species Act, is composed of federal officials from various agencies and "individual[s]
from each affected State."341 While an Innovative Therapies Committee would not
operate with the same goals of the Endangered Species Committee, as the Endangered
Species Committee can waive the application of federal law, an Innovative Therapies
Committee could be structured similarly.342
As the Endangered Species Committee is composed of representatives from federal
agencies that address issues related to environmental law and economics, an Innovative
Therapies Committee could similarly include representatives from relevant operating
agencies within the HHS and economic agencies. Thus, the membership of such a
committee could include, paralleling the membership of the Endangered Species
Committee,
(A) the Secretary of HHS,
(B) the Commissioner of the FDA,
(C) the Director of the NIH,
(D) the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors,
(E) the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,343 and
(F) "individual[s] from each affected State."344
"[I]ndividual[s] from each affected state" would be defined differently than it is for the
Endangered Species Committee, as "affected state" would be different in tile case of
innovative therapies.345 Thus, the term "individual[s] from each affected State" could be
defined as states that have established entities providing these innovative therapies or
could be construed in a way that emphasizes interested state officials, such as those who
are housed in state departments of public health or State Attorneys General.346 If none of
these departments were sufficient, in light of the suggestion in Part III.D.3 for state
clearinghouses, in keeping with recent trends in state administrative law, states could
create a new administrative agency to address the regulation of innovative therapies.347

341. Id. § 1536(e)(3) (providing the membership of the Endangered Species Committee); see also Kate
R. Bowers. Saying What the Law Isn't: Legislative Delegations of Waiver Authority in Environmental Laws, 34
HARV. ENV1L. L. REV. 257, 263 (2010).
342. See Bowers, supra note 341, at 265 (noting that "the Endangered Species Committee . . . normally
decides whether waivers of the [Endangered Species Act] are warranted"); see also Barron & Rakoff, supra note
180, at 304.
343. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also exercises regulatory authority related to the use of dmgs
in the United States. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1162 (2012) (discussing a memorandum of understanding between the FDA and the
FTC regarding enforcement actions related to prescription dmg advertising).
344. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e).
345. See id. § 1536(e)(3)(G).
346. See, e.g., Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 19, at 2160 ("In the realm of dmgs,
California's Department of Public Health has its own Drug Safety Program division, which monitors the drug,
cosmetic, and 'other consumer product industries' to ensure that 'products are not adulterated, misbranded or
falsely advertised."'); Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, supra note 182, at 588-90 (proposing "the
introduction of a novel notification provision to the state attorneys general and to the National Association of
Attorneys General" because of their interest in issues of federal preemption of state law).
347. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 107, 129-30 (2018) ("States have also created numerous new agencies to respond to emerging problems
. . . [such as] for ground water management and hazardous waste[,] . . . campaign finance, recycling, and census
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Ultimately, the benefit of such a structured committee is that it requires state and federal
cooperation and creates a regime in which the FDA is required to consult with states and
recognize their jurisdiction. Such a structure also inserts a check into the FDA's
notoriously obscure regulatory process.348 Further, inserting a check into the regulatory
process simultaneously creates a structure that facilitates discussions between the state
and federal govermnents thus providing for increased opportunities to share lessons
learned in regulation. The cooperative framework would differ from current avenues for
state participation as it would not just involve a state's input solely on matters of federal
jurisdiction or product formulation but would also involve a discussion between peer
regulators.349
2.

State Mandatory Disclosure Laws

While state regimes tend to emphasize the ability to avail oneself of legal remedies
after an individual has been harmed, there are also simpler solutions that do not disrupt
that jurisdictional balance. Just as states can add variety to the regulatory system, the
federal govermnent can also influence the states. Federal regulation already exists as a
floor in the regulation of innovative medical techniques as they implicate federal
jurisdiction based on their use of medical products.35° Federal jurisdiction already
influences state regulation as states borrow definitions from the federal government.35 1
As previously mentioned, California enacted a law requiring the communication of
specific information related to stem cell treatments that were not approved by the
FDA. 352 This law used the federal definition of "human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue
based products" when defining stem cell therapies.353 Drawing on California's response
to stem cell clinics, which emphasized information disclosure and informed consent,
other states could adopt similar measures for innovative therapies.354

data. . . . One way to understand these dual trends is to say that states are taking on new tasks and are able to
perform them in a more coordinated and thus effective way. . . . In an evermore complex society. states
continually face new challenges; moreover. they are often able to respond more quickly than the national
government. Cybersecurity and opiate addiction . . . are recent examples of states breaking new regulatory
ground." (footnotes omitted)).
348. See, e.g., Zettler, Indirect Consequences, supra note 30, at 1092; see also Thomas 0. McGarity,
Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of GeneticallyModified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 477-78
(2002); Laurence Tai,A Tale of Two Transparency Attempts at FDA, 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 423, 425-26 (2013);
Megan S. Wright et a!., WhenBiomarkers Are Not Enough: FDA Evaluation ofEffectiveness of Neuropsychiatric
Devices for Disorders of Consciousness, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 276, 308-09 (2018).
349. See Sharkey, States Versus FDA, supra note 78, at 1621 (noting that Massachusetts was given an
opportunity to provide input into the FDA regulatory process before Massachusetts instituted restrictions on the
sale of Zohydro, an opioid, within the state).
350. See supra Section I for a discussion of current federal regulation of medical products.
3 51. See infra note 3 53 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
353. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 684(a) (West 2019) ("For the purpose of this section: (1) 'FDA' means
the United States Food and Drug Administration. (2) 'HCT/Ps' means human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue
based products, as defined in Section 1271.3 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as amended August
31, 2016, as published in the Federal Register (81 Fed. Reg. 60223). (3) 'Stern cell therapy' means a therapy
involving the use of HCT/Ps.").
354. See supra note 85-86 for a discussion of California's stern cell research law.
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State Clearinghouses for Adverse Event Reporting

Innovation is both a scientific and a regulatory goal. In the scientific realm,
significant sums continue to be spent on scientific research.355 Legislatively, Congress
has aimed to shorten the time delay between scientific research success and market
availability.356 Often, congressional solutions to innovation that involve states also
involve federal funding, which is used to encourage state policy innovation.357 Scholars
have noted that federal incentives, notably federal funding, increase the pace of policy
diffusion throughout the states.358 Other scholars have observed that Congress has
instructed the FDA to create adaptive regulations to address medical innovations.359 One
method of strengthening that instruction is to use federal funding to incentivize states to
collaborate in the creation of those adaptive regulations, while simultaneously
recognizing that states have jurisdiction over some aspects of innovative therapies. The
disadvantage of such a solution, however, is that federal grants often come with federal
restrictions and oversight.360
One cooperative improvement to the regulation of innovative therapies would be
strengthening opportunities for states to monitor these innovative therapies.361 The
federal goveflllllent could provide funds to states in a pilot program for those that would
like to establish clearinghouses for adverse event reporting so as to increase state
monitoring of the practice of medicine, similar to the post-market surveillance of
pharmaceuticals.362 States could similarly maintain databases addressing clinical trials in
their states, similar to the federal goveflllllent's existing database.363 States could also
use statutory language similar to California's 20 17 informed consent provision so as to
355. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 345, 373 (2007) ("The reason that the budget of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has grown, even
as the budgets of other science agencies have languished, is that health-related innovation enjoys broader
political appeal than other scientific pursuits. We value health, and we believe that high quality biomedical
science will have public health payoffs. FDA regulation similarly promotes public health by promoting high
quality scientific investigation of a particular sort-specifically, the conduct of scientifically rigorous clinical
trials of dmgs.").
356. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various acts of Congress aimed
at hastening the regulatory process for medical innovation.
357. See, e.g., Kristin Madison, Building a Better Laboratory: The Federal Role in Promoting Health
System Experimentation, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 765, 769 (2014) ("First, the federal government could spur more state
policy innovation through funding programs that provide the same sort of financial incentives to states as those
currently offered to private health care providers."); id. at 788-89 (explaining how federal funding through the
ACA has helped promote the states' innovation).
358. See, e.g., Susan Welch & Kay Thompson, The Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy
Innovation, 24 AM. J. POL. Ser. 715, 723 (1980).
359. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 357, at 799 ("It is tme that federal funding of the ACA's programs
will affect state policies, as federal funding directed to states always has. To obtain Medicaid funding, for
example, states must comply with federal mandates dictating the stmcture of their Medicaid programs.").
361. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need for greater monitoring
of medical innovation.
362. See, e.g., Sharkey, States Versus FDA, supra note 78, at 1622 ("[S]tates could plan an enhanced role
in the post-approval risk surveillance phase of the dmg regulatory process.").
363. See, e.g., U.S. NAT'L LIER. MED. CLINICAi.TRIALS.GOV, http://clinicaltrials.gov/
[https://perrna.cc/Z7JG-8ZWA] (last visited Feb. I, 2020).
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ensure that patients are adequately warned of the potential adverse impacts of innovative
therapies. 364 States are closer to innovative therapies as, in spite of FDA enforcement
action in the realm of regenerative therapies, clinics offering them continue to flourish
in many states. 365 Just as the structure of the Medicaid program provides "broad
mandatory requirements that state Medicaid programs must follow, but states retain
considerable flexibility to cover additional eligibility groups and benefits," this Article's
cooperative framework provides a floor of broad mandatory requirements, as established
through federal product approval, that would apply to innovative therapies.366
CONCLUSION

Scientific and technological innovations continue to advance at a faster pace than
the law. The tension between innovation, safety, and regulation is longstanding. 367 This
Article explores the array of available solutions for improving life sciences regulation
before explaining that the cooperative governance structures used in other areas of law
could significantly improve the regulation of life sciences innovation, namely innovative
therapies, especially as these innovations continue to evolve past standard legal
classifications. This Article's proposed solutions to improving the current regulatory
system draw on health law and administrative law, among other fields.
The current system of regulation attempts to place innovative therapies within the
categories of products that the FDA regulates in an ad hoc fashion that does not fully
contemplate their complexities and the existence of state jurisdiction. 368 A system for
efficiently regulating those therapies, which do not currently or clearly fit within the
FDA's regulatory scheme or the practice of medicine, is inevitable and developing that
system before those products are practice ready is an ideal way to regulate. 369 The
cooperative framework focuses on a number of criteria that apply for many therapies and
also flags areas for concern. In other words, implementing a cooperative system for the
regulation of innovative therapies would allow for a regulatory scheme in which the law
manages to keep up with science (or to at least avoids being exponentially outpaced by
it).

364. See supra note 86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the informed consent provision in
California's stern cell research law.
365. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text for a discussion of FDA regulation of regenerative
therapies.
366. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 219, at 214.
367. See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., Hoffmann et al., supra note 6, at 1390 ("The advent of these applications for [rnicrobiota
transplants] poses challenges for regulatory bodies. The transplanted material is not a 'typical' drug, and thus
may not be appropriate for the drug regulatory pathway. The material consists of a community of highly
dynamic, metabolically active organisms . . . . Each batch of 'product' is different, making characterization of
the transplanted material problematic.").
369. See, e.g., Javitt & Hudson, supra note 17, at 1210.

